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Abstract
Software Defined Networking (SDN) is developing as a new solution
for the development and innovation of the Internet. SDN is expected
to be the ideal future for the Internet since it can provide controllable,
dynamic and cost-effective networking. The emergence of SDN pro-
vides a unique opportunity to achieve network security in a more effi-
cient and flexible manner. One key advantage of SDN, as compared to
traditional networks, is that by virtue of centralized control, it allows
better provisioning of network security. Nevertheless, the flexibility
provided by the SDN architecture manifests several new network se-
curity issues that must be addressed to strengthen SDN security. The
SDN has original structural vulnerabilities, which are the centralized
controller, the control-data interface and the control-application inter-
faces. These vulnerabilities can be exploited by intruders to conduct
several types of attacks.
Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS), which is an important
part of network architecture, is used to detect network intrusions and
secure the whole network. In this thesis, we propose an SDN-based
NIDS (DeepIDS) using Deep Learning (DL) algorithms to detect
anomalies in the SDN architecture. Firstly, we evaluate the potential
of DL for flow-based anomaly detection with different flow features.
Through experiments, we confirm that the DL approach has the po-
tential for flow-based anomaly detection in the SDN environment.
Secondly, we propose a Gated Recurrent Unit Recurrent Neural Net-
work (GRU-RNN) to improve the detection rate of the DeepIDS. Our
experimental results show that the proposed GRU-RNN model im-
proves the detection rate significantly without deteriorating network
performance. The performance of our system in terms of accuracy,
throughput, latency and resource utilization shows that DeepIDS does
not affect the performance of the OpenFlow controller, and so is a fea-
sible approach.
Finally, we introduce an unsupervised approach (SAE-1SVM) to solve
an unlabeled and imbalanced dataset problem. This approach yields
a high detection rate while maintaining a significantly low process-
ing time. Through extensive experimental evaluations, we conclude
that our proposed approach exhibits a strong potential for intrusion
detection in the SDN environments.
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Chapter1
Introduction
The motivation behind this work is presented. Some challenges of intru-
sion detection are introduced, and then the critical research questions are
identified. Finally, the contributions of the work are given along with the
organization of the thesis.
In This Chapter:
1.1 Motivation
Software Defined Networking (SDN) is a developing architecture that is dynamic,
manageable, cost-effective, and adaptable, thus making it ideal for the high-
bandwidth, dynamic nature of today’s applications and networks. SDNs are cur-
rently being deployed in many network environments, from home and enterprise
networks to datacenters (e.g., IBM, Cisco, Google WAN B4 [9], Huawei carrier
network [10]). As can be seen in Figure 1.1, the SDN market has grown to more
than a $9.5 billion market in 2019 and is predicted to continue to grow to $13.8
billion by 2021. The capabilities of SDN (e.g., logically centralized controller,
1
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and global network overview) help to solve several security issues in a traditional
network and bring the ability to control network traffic at a fine-grained level.
However, the SDN architecture itself also introduces some new attack threats
and security vulnerabilities. Kreutz et al. [11] introduced seven threat vectors in
SDN. Several attacks can be conducted in the SDN architecture. For instance,
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks can overwhelm an SDN controller
and a communication channel with artificial service calls. A Man-in-the-Middle
attack can break links between the controller and the switches and claim control
of the network.
Figure 1.1: The SDN Market Size Prediction [1]
Because of the wide variety of types of SDN deployments, SDN security is a
serious concern and has recently been extensively researched - see [12] and [13] for
more detail. Therefore, there is a need to develop an efficient network intrusion
2
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detection system (NIDS). NIDS is one of the most crucial parts of network archi-
tecture. Several machine learning (ML) approaches have been proposed to secure
the SDNs. Given a set of training data, ML algorithms learn non-linear patterns
of training data and then detect attacks inside the SDNs. These algorithms can be
statistical [14] [15], probabilistic [16] or Support Vector Machine [17] [18]. Despite
the high accuracy and performance obtained in several fields, ML algorithms used
in intrusion detection tend to have some limitations as mentioned in [19]. These
include the difficulty of determining the discriminator, the availability of labelled
datasets for classification and evaluation, the high cost of errors and the diversity
of network traffic. In recent years, ML has been used by many researchers for
intrusion detection in the SDN environments. However, these techniques usually
lead to a high rate of false positives that is a significant concern for practical
NIDSs.
Recently, Deep Learning (DL) has emerged and achieved significant success in
the field of speech recognition [20], image recognition [21], and natural language
processing [22] [23]. DL is capable of automatically finding correlations in raw
data, and so it can improve the intrusion detection rate. Motivated by the devel-
opment of DL, we extended this research trend to a DL-based intrusion detection
approach for the SDN context. We believe DL is a promising method for the next
generation of intrusion detection. DL can be used, and so we can acquire a high
detection rate. The flow-based and programmable natures of SDNs also facilitate
the development of NIDSs.
3
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1.2 Challenges
In general, there are a few challenges for flow-based intrusion detection in the
SDN architecture as follows:
• Network traffic is dynamic, diverse and constantly changing. In addition,
network attacks keep evolving and become more intelligent and aggressive.
The dynamic nature of network traffic makes intrusion detection extremely
challenging.
• Traditional NIDSs use a large number of hand-crafted features to improve
intrusion detection accuracy. However, an SDN provides us with a limited
number of raw flow features. Therefore, it is a challenge to improve intrusion
detection accuracy with these limited raw flow features.
• NIDS is supposed to provide real-time intrusion detection and mitigation.
Therefore, computational complexity and network overheads also need to
be seriously considered.
• For ML/DL intrusion detection approaches, the network data is signifi-
cantly important. These datasets are used for training and testing systems
for intrusion detection. The availability of labelled network datasets is a
big problem. The SDN architecture is still a new technology, so network
datasets for it are either quite rare and/or unpublished. As a result, it is
difficult to train and evaluate a model in a supervised manner to detect
intrusions in the SDN network.
4
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1.3 Objective and Scope of the Thesis
In the previous sections, we have given the motivation and some of the challenges
in the field. The primary objective of this thesis is to develop a NIDS under the
context of SDN using DL. Figure 1.2 describes the overview of our NIDS that
uses DL to detect intrusions in SDN networks. The details of the proposed NIDS
will be presented in Chapter 4.
Raw
Network
Traffic
Network
Flow
Features
Feature
Pro-
cessing
Deep
Neural
Network
Build-
ing/
Opti-
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Results
Figure 1.2: The Overview of the NIDS
We present four main research questions as follows:
• Does the SDN facilitate the development of a flow-based NIDS?
• Can we improve the intrusion detection accuracy with limited raw features
in the SDN architecture using DL?
• How do we take advantage of DL to solve the dataset problem in SDNs?
• Can we develop an end-to-end system to effectively detect intrusions in the
SDN paradigm?
1.4 Limitations and Constraints
In the proposed methods, we have a few limitations and assumptions.
5
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• In this thesis, we have to adapt some conventional datasets to the SDN
architecture. This adaption may not be close enough to a real SDN-based
dataset but many researchers in the same field still use it. In Chapter 4 and
5, the packet-based NSL-KDD dataset is adapted for our experiments. This
adaption may affect the generalization and application of our approach in
the SDN context. However, we selected some most basic network features
having similar characteristics in both packet-based and flow-based datasets
to minimize this gap. We assume that these network features are inter-
changeable for both traditional and SDN-based networks.
• Because of the use of published datasets, all the attacks concerned in this
thesis are just related to network and application layers (i.e., L2, L3 and
L7). This thesis does not consider any kind of attacks related to L1 physical
layer which is also an important part of the network. In addition, because of
the nature of pulished datasets, we have not considered all types of network
topologies in our experiment.
1.5 Thesis Outline and Contributions
This PhD thesis describes the research carried out in the development of a NIDS
in the SDN environment using DL. Chapter 2 discusses the SDN architecture
and its security issues. A literature overview about DL is presented in Chapter 3.
Chapter 4 looks at the potential of applying DL for intrusion detection in the SDN
and the effect of different features on the detection rate. Chapter 5 is devoted to
the use of a Deep Recurrent Neural Network to improve the detection accuracy
of an SDN-based NIDS. A hybrid unsupervised approach for Distributed Denial
6
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of Service (DDoS) attacks detection in SDN is proposed in Chapter 6. Chapter
7 concludes the thesis and gives further research directions.
The content of each chapter is summarized below:
Chapter 2: Software Defined Networking
In this chapter, we introduce the SDN architecture, and the OpenFlow pro-
tocol. The NIDS and its detection performance evaluation methodology are also
introduced in this chapter. We also present some related work within the use of
DL for intrusion detection in the SDN.
Chapter 3: Deep Learning
Chapter 3 presents a literature overview of the DL algorithm. At the end of
this chapter, we introduce network datasets used in this thesis.
Chapter 4: DeepIDS: Deep Learning Approach for Intrusion Detec-
tion in Software Defined Networking
In this chapter, we propose an SDN-based NIDS (DeepIDS). We answer the
following research question: Does the SDN facilitate the development of a flow-
based NIDS? We implement a DL approach for intrusion detection in the SDN
architecture. A deep neural network (DNN) is created for binary classification.
Through experiments, we confirm that the DL approach has the potential for
flow-based anomaly detection in the SDN environment. We also evaluate the
performance of our system in terms of throughput, latency and resource utiliza-
tion. Our test results show that DeepIDS does not affect the performance of the
OpenFlow controller, and so is a feasible approach.
Chapter 5: Deep Recurrent Neural Networks for SDN-based Intru-
sion Detection Systems
In this chapter, we address the following research question: Can we improve
7
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the intrusion detection accuracy with limited raw features in the SDN architec-
ture using DL? To improve the detection accuracy, in this chapter, we propose a
Gated Recurrent Unit Recurrent Neural Network (GRU-RNN) enabled intrusion
detection for SDN. The proposed approach was tested using several datasets,
and we achieved a quite high detection accuracy with low dimensional feature
sets that can be extracted at SDN controllers. We also evaluated network per-
formance of our proposed approach in terms of throughput and latency. Our
test results show that the proposed GRU-RNN model does not deteriorate the
network performance. Through extensive experimental evaluation, we conclude
that our proposed approach exhibits a strong potential for intrusion detection in
the SDN environment.
Chapter 6: Deep Learning Approach Combining Stacked Autoen-
coder with One-class SVM for DDoS Attack Detection in SDNs
Recently, several ML/DL intrusion detection approaches have been proposed
to secure SDN networks. However, these approaches cannot deal adequately with
imbalanced and unlabeled datasets. So, the goal of this chapter is to detect the
network attacks in an unsupervised manner by using the flow table information.
In this chapter, we propose a hybrid approach using the Stack Autoencoder and
One-class Support Vector Machine (SAE-1SVM) for DDoS attack detection. The
experimental results show that the proposed algorithm can achieve an average
accuracy of 99.35% with a small set of flow features. The SAE-1SVM shows that
it can reduce the processing time significantly while maintaining a high detection
rate. In summary, the SAE-1SVM can work well with imbalanced and unlabelled
datasets and yields a high detection accuracy. The research question “How do we
take advantage of DL to solve the dataset problem in SDNs?” has been addressed
8
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in this chapter.
Chapter 7: Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter, we provide a summary of the work in the thesis. We also give
final conclusions and discuss some drawbacks and limitations of this work. Then
further extensions and future research directions are also presented.
1.6 Publications
The work undertaken in this thesis has resulted in the following publications.
• Tang, T. A., Mhamdi, L., McLernon, D., Zaidi, S. A. R., & Ghogho, M.
(2016, October). Deep learning approach for network intrusion detection
in software defined networking. In Wireless Networks and Mobile Commu-
nications (WINCOM), 2016 International Conference on (pp. 258-263).
IEEE.
• Tang, T. A., Mhamdi, L., McLernon, D., Zaidi, S. A. R., & Ghogho, M.
(2018, June). Deep recurrent neural network for intrusion detection in SDN-
based networks. In 2018 4th IEEE Conference on Network Softwarization
and Workshops (NetSoft) (pp. 202-206). IEEE.
• Tang, T. A., McLernon, D., Mhamdi, L., Zaidi, S. A. R., & Ghogho,
M. Intrusion Detection in SDN-based Networks: Deep Recurrent Neural
Network Approach. In: Tang M ed. Deep Learning Applications for Cyber
Security. (In Press)
Finally, as a result of the WINCOM paper (and its 111 citations as of 10/06/2019),
Tuan Anh Tang was offered a three-month internship at the world-famous BT
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labs in Martlesham Heath, Ipswich to work on a project “Anomaly Detection
for the Internet of Things Devices using Software Defined Networking and Deep
Learning”.
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Chapter2
Software Defined Networking
Firstly, the SDN architecture and its security issues are described in detail.
Secondly, an overview of the NIDS is introduced, and some related works
are also discussed. Finally, we demonstrate a toy example of SDN-based
NIDS in detecting DoS attacks.
In This Chapter:
2.1 Software Defined Networking
2.1.1 Definition
Modern networks were developed many decades ago and remain mostly un-
changed over the past decade. It is mainly decentralized, autonomous and built
from a large number of network devices such as routers, switches and numerous
types of middleboxes (e.g., firewall, and load balancing) with several complex pro-
tocols implemented on them. This network equipment is traditionally developed
by several manufacturers. Each manufacturer has its own designs, firmware, and
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software to operate their own hardware in a proprietary and closed way. Network
operators have to configure policies to respond to a wide range of network events
and applications. They have to manually transform these high-level policies into
low-level configuration commands with very limited tools. In fact, network de-
vices are usually vertically-integrated black boxes that make network management
and performance tuning quite challenging and error-prone. Because of its vast
development base and its essential role in our society’s critical infrastructure,
the modern network has become extremely difficult to evolve both in term of its
physical infrastructure as well as its protocol and performance. In practice, it is
quite difficult to deploy a new version of an existing protocol (e.g., IPv6). These
issues lead to a need for a new network paradigm that makes the network more
scalable, dynamic and easier to manage and configure.
The idea of “programmable networks” has been proposed as a way to facili-
tate the evolution of current networks. The concept of programmable networks
and decoupled control logic has been around for several years. In the past, vari-
ous technologies were developed to enable the programmability of communication
networks. In the mid-1990s, Active Networks (AN) [24] were developed with the
basic idea of injecting program into data packets. Switches extract and execute
programs from data packets so that new routing mechanisms and network ser-
vices can be implemented without the modification of the forwarding hardware.
However, AN did not gain much attention because of its security and performance
concerns. Also in mid 1990s, Devolved Control of ATM Network (DCAN) [25]
was aimed at designing and developing the necessary infrastructure for scalable
control and management of ATM networks. The premise of DCAN is that con-
trol/management functions of the various network devices (e.g., ATM switches)
12
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should be decoupled from the device themselves and delegated to external entities
dedicated to that purpose. In the first half of the 2000s, the separation of the con-
trol and data plane had been considered as one of the central points of simplifying
network design. Forwarding and Control Element Separation (ForCES) [26] is a
pioneer in this area. ForCES classified the network components into two distinct
types which are the forwarding element and the control element. The forwarding
element only forwards and filters traffic. The control plane provides instructions
for processing packets. These elements communicate with each other via a stan-
dardised open interface, which is considered to be a core feature of the ForCES
protocol. Although ForCES is still under active development, it is not widely
adopted by major vendors. The IETF Network Configuration Working Group
proposed NETCONF [27], which is a management protocol for modifying the
configurations of network devices, in 2006. Network devices can expose an API
that helps to send and to retrieve extensible configuration data. However, there
is no separation between control and data planes. In 2006, the SANE/ Ethane
project [28] proposed a new architecture for enterprise networks. Ethane focuses
on using a centralized controller to manage policy and security in a network. It
can be said that Ethane is the predecessor and the foundation for what would
become SDN today.
SDN is proposed as a solution for all network challenges. SDN is based on the
idea of decoupling the control plane and data plane and producing less sophisti-
cated data plane devices. In general, SDN is built under four principles:
• Separation of control and data plane: these planes must be logically
separated and connected via an interface. The control aspect is removed
from forwarding devices and delegated to an external entity.
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• Network programmability: The provision of an open API is a core
aspect of the SDN architecture. Software and scripts should be able to
access, configure, and modify network elements with ease.
• Network abstraction: the view of the network is virtualized for any ele-
ments of a higher hierarchy. Services and applications are aware of the state
of the whole network, but physical attributes and resources are irrelevant
for configurations and computations.
• Logically centralized control: all forwarding devices of a domain are
linked to a controlling entity and are subjected to its enacted policies
This way, SDN provides network-wide visibility and flexible programmability
to network administrations. This also removes the differences, makes the network
administration independent of data plane devices vendors and allows network
administrators to design and control the network with their own applications and
respond quickly to changing business needs. SDN opens up the means for new
innovation and applications.
SDN is defined by the Open Networking Foundation (ONF) which was founded
in 2011 by Microsoft, Google, Facebook, Yahoo, Verizon and Deutsche Telekom.
As of 2015, the organization has more than 150 industry members and receives
endorsement by several network equipment vendors such as Cisco, Dell, Brocade
and HP. An SDN architecture decouples the network control and forwarding
functions enabling the network control to become directly programmable. The
separation of the control plane from the data plane lays the ground for the SDN
architecture. Network switches become simple forwarding devices, and the control
logic is implemented in a physical or logical centralized controller. The logically
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centralized controller dictates the network behaviour and offers several benefits.
Firstly, it is simpler and less error-prone to modify network policies through
software from a single place without reconfiguring individual devices. Secondly, a
control program can automatically react to dynamic changes in the network and
thus maintain the high-level policies in place. Thirdly, the centralised control
logic has global knowledge of the whole network, including the network topology
and the state of the network resources, thus giving flexibility and simplifying the
development of more sophisticated network functions. For example, the controller
can dynamically adjust flow tables to avoid congestion or apply different routing
algorithms to different types of traffic. The ability to program the network to
control the underlying data plane is, therefore, the crucial value proposition of
SDN [11]. The advantages of SDN in various scenarios (e.g., the enterprise, and
the datacenter) and across various backbone networks have already been proven
(e.g., Google B4 [9], Huawei carrier network [10]).
As depicted in Figure. 2.1, SDN architecture is divided into three layers, which
are infrastructure layer, control layer and application layer.
• Infrastructure layer (Tier-1): This layer consists of the forwarding
hardware such as switches/routers and all software interfaces and hard-
ware components in the forwarding hardware. OpenFlow switches can be
classified into two types: Software-based and Hardware-based implementa-
tion. Software switches are typically well-designed and comprise complete
features. Software switches are emerging as one of the most promising
solutions for data centers and virtualized network infrastructures. Ex-
amples of software-based OpenFlow switches include ofsoftswitch13 [29],
Open vSwitch [30], Pantou [31], and Pica8 [32]. Hardware-based Open-
15
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Figure 2.1: A three-layer SDN Architecture [2]
Flow switches are typically implemented as Application-Specific Integrated
Circuits (ASICs). They provide line rate forwarding for large numbers of
ports but lack the flexibility of software implementations. Various commer-
cial vendors are supporting OpenFlow in their hardware switches (e.g., HP,
Pronto, Cisco, Dell, Intell, NEC, and Juniper).
• Control layer (Tier-2): Network intelligence is installed in a software
base logically centralized SDN controller. The control layer regulates and
manages forwarding hardware, i.e., Tier-1. The controller is the core of
SDN networks. It lies between the network devices at the one end and the
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applications at the other end. An SDN controller takes the responsibility
of establishing every flow in the network by installing flow entries on switch
devices. One can distinguish two flow setup modes: Proactive vs Reac-
tive. In proactive settings, flow rules are pre-installed in the flow tables.
Thus, the flow setup occurs before the first packet of a flow arrives at the
OpenFlow switch. The main advantages of this approach is a negligible
setup delay and a reduction in the frequency of contacting the controller.
However, it may overflow the flow table of the switches. With respect to a
reactive approach, a flow rule is set by the controller only if no entry exists
in the flow tables and this is performed as soon as the first packet of a flow
reaches the OpenFlow switch. Thus, only the first packet triggers a commu-
nication between the switch and the controller. The control plane acts as
an intermediary layer between the application and data plane. The control
plane in SDN is called a controller; it communicates with the application
plane via the northbound communication channel and with the switches
via the southbound communication channel. In this thesis, we focus on
an OpenFlow-related controller because OpenFlow is prominently success-
ful, whereas other approaches are not as successful in practice. To date,
various OpenFlow controllers have been publicly released, and most of the
controllers currently support OpenFlow version 1.0 [33]. The controllers are
summarized in Table 2.1.
• Application layer (Tier-3): Application and services take advantage
of control and infrastructure layers. Conceptually, the application layer
is above the control layer, and this enables easy development of network
17
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Controller Open Source Language Origin
NOX [34] Yes C++/Python Nicira Networks
POX [35] Yes Python Nicira Networks
Maestro [36] Yes Java Rice University
Beacon [37] Yes Java Stanford University
SNAC [38] No C++/Python Nicira Networks
RISE [39] Yes C and Ruby NEC
Floodlight [40] Yes Java Big Switch Networks
McNettle [41] Yes Nettle/Haskell Yale University
MUL [42] Yes C KulCloud
RYU [43] Yes Python NTT OSRG and VA Linux
OpenDaylight [44] Yes Java Multiple contributors
ONOS [45] Yes Java Multiple contributors
Table 2.1: SDN Controllers
applications. These applications perform all network management tasks .
Some examples of SDN application are load balancers, network monitors,
and intrusion detection systems (IDS).
2.1.2 OpenFlow Protocol
The OpenFlow protocol [46] is one of the first standardized protocols for SDNs.
Even though OpenFlow is not the only available protocol (e.g., Extensible Mes-
saging and Presence Protocol XMPP [47], ForCES [26], Open vSwitch Database
(OVSDB) [48], OpFlex [49]), it is considered as standard and supported by mul-
tiple companies in their SDN ready solution. OpenFlow was first proposed by
McKeown et al. with an objective to enable easy network experiments in campus
networks [46] and is currently used in most practical SDNs.
Different versions of the OpenFlow protocol specification are available. The
most widely deployed version of OpenFlow is OpenFlow version 1.0 [33], which
was released on 31st December 2009. Other versions are 1.1 [3], 1.2 [50], 1.3 [51],
18
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1.4 [52] , and 1.5 [53]. A detailed list of changes included in every version is
available in the OpenFlow 1.5.1 specification document [54].
The OpenFlow specification describes an open protocol to allow software ap-
plications to program the flow table of different switches. An OpenFlow consists
of three mains components: An OpenFlow-compliant switch, a secure channel
and a controller. Switches use flow tables to forward packets. A flow table is a
list of flow entries. Each entry has match fields, counters and instructions.
According to SDN architecture, an OpenFlow switch is a simple forwarding
device that processes incoming packets based on its flow table. As illustrated
in Figure 2.2, OpenFlow Switch consists of one or more flow tables and a group
table, which perform packet lookups and forwarding, and an OpenFlow channel
to an external controller. The switch communicates with the controller, and the
controller manages the switch via the OpenFlow protocol.
Figure 2.2: OpenFlow Switch [3]
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In the OpenFlow switch, flow tables consist of flow entries, each of which
determines how packets which belong to a flow, will be processed and forwarded.
As illustrated in Table 2.2, flow entries typically consist of three fields:
Match fields Counters Instructions
Table 2.2: Main Components of a Flow Entry
• Match fields: used to match incoming packets. Match fields may contain
information found in the 15-tuple packet’s header. The packet’s header
fields are listed in Table 2.3.
• Counters: used to collect statistics for a particular flow, such as the number
of received packets, number of bytes and duration of the flow.
• Instructions: a set of instructions or actions, to be applied upon a match;
they dictate how to handle matching packets. Two example instructions
are forwarding or dropping the packet.
The match fields describe with which packets this entry is associated. They
include the ingress port and some specific header fields of packets, such as IP
address and Mac address. These fields are set by the network administrator from
the controller. They can be set with a specific value or can be wild-carded to
match with any flow.
20
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Table 2.3: Match Fields in OpenFlow
Figure 2.3 illustrates the packet processing of the pipeline. Before the pipeline
begins, the metadata field and the action set for the incoming packet are initial-
ized as empty. The matching process starts from the first flow table (Table 0)
to the last flow table (Table n). The packet is matched against the consecu-
tive flow tables from each of which the highest-priority matching flow entry is
selected. The pipeline ends when no matching flow table entry is found or no
“Goto” instruction is set in the matching flow table entry. At each flow table,
the packet will be processed in three steps. Firstly, the packet will be matched
with highest-priority matching flow entry. Secondly, a set of instructions will be
applied to the packet as seen in Figure 2.3. Finally, the matched packet will be
sent to the next flow table for further actions.
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The details of the matching process are explained in Figure 2.4. When a
packet arrives at an OpenFlow switch, packet header fields are extracted and
matched against the matching fields portion of the flow table entries. If any
matching entries are found, the switch will select the highest prioritized entry,
and it applies the appropriate set of instructions, or actions, associated with the
matched flow entries. If the flow table look-up procedure does not result in a
match, the action taken by the switch will depend on the instructions defined by
the table-miss flow entry. This particular entry specifies a set of actions that will
be performed when no match is found for an incoming packet, such as dropping
the packet, continue the matching process on the next flow table, or forwarding
the packet to the controller over the OpenFlow channel. As for the default action,
the switch will send an OFPT PACKET IN message to the controller to request
for a rule or a specific action for the packet. After that, the controller will issue
either an OFPT FLOW MOD or an OFPT PACKET OUT message containing
the instructions on how the switch should process that packet.
An essential aspect of SDN architecture is the link between the control and
data planes. As forwarding elements are controlled by an open interface, it is im-
portant that this link remains available and secure. The control and data planes
exchange control messages with each other via the southbound interface using
standardised protocols. The OpenFlow protocol, which is standardised by the
ONF, is one of the most popular implementations of controller-switch interac-
tions. An OpenFlow switch has to initiate a communication channel with the
controller for exchanging control messages. This connection can use plain TCP
or be encrypted with TLS. When the connection is established successfully, the
switch and the controller send an OFPT HELLO message to each other to ne-
23
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Figure 2.4: OpenFlow Packet Matching Process [3]
gotiate the protocol version for the communication channel. An OFPT ERROR
will be sent to the recipients if any failure happens. After the switch and the
controller have configured the channel successfully, OpenFlow messages can be
exchanged over the channel.
The OpenFlow controller is responsible for managing the whole network. It
consists of one or more software controllers. It controls the forwarding table,
gathers information from the data plane and provides information to the services
and applications in the application tier about the network operations. Network
statistics monitoring is one of the most critical factors of SDN. An OpenFlow
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switch calculates statistics of the network traffic and provides the information
to the controller as requested. In OpenFlow version 1.0, the network statistics
consist of flow statistics, table statistics, port statistics, and queue statistics. In
the latest OpenFlow version 1.5.1 [54], the switch can also provide other types
of statistics and meters to support network monitoring, such as group statistics,
action bucket statistics, and per-flow meter. With all of these statistics, the
network administrator can know the traffic status of each switch and link and
can adjust the network efficiently.
2.1.3 Security in SDN
The SDN concept was initially designed with significant advantages over the tra-
ditional network. One of the crucial benefits of SDN is to make the highly vul-
nerable traditional network more secure and robust. By centralizing the control
plane, SDN considerably simplifies the way that we integrate security mechanisms
into our network. The evolution of networking brings several advantages, but it
also brings the development of the network attacks. Attacks can be initiated
from malicious management applications, the controller, and compromised hosts
or switches. The main causes of concern lie in the SDN’s main benefits: network
programmability and control logic centralization. These capabilities introduce
new faults and attack planes, which open the doors for new threats that did not
exist before or are harder to exploit. The security issues of SDNs has been re-
searched extensively in [11], [12], [13] and [55]. According to Kreutz et al. [12],
there are seven main potential threat vectors identified in SDN and summarized
in Table 2.4.
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No. Threat Vector
1 Forged or faked traffic flow
2 Attacks on vulnerabilities in switches
3 Attacks on control plane communications
4 Attacks on and vulnerabilities in controllers
5 Lack of mechanisms to ensure trust between the controller
and management application
6 Attacks on and vulnerabilities in administrative stations
7 Lack of trusted resources for forensics and remediation
Table 2.4: SDN Threat Vectors
Among these seven threat vectors, number 3,4 and 5 are not present in the
traditional network. They are specific to SDNs as they arise from the separation
of the control and data plane and the logical centralization of the controllers.
Other vectors were already presented in traditional networking. Threat vector
number 5 would have the most severe impact on the SDN architecture because
it could affect the entire network. Attacks in SDNs can be categorized into
three categories: Control plane specific, Data plane specific and Communication
channel specific. All of these attacks are summarized in Table 2.5. More details
about these attacks can be found in [55].
Attack Plane Attack Type
Control Plane
DoS
Network overview manipulation
Unauthorized network mangement
Network service neutralization
Communication Channel
Eavesdropping
Man-in-the-Middle
Data Plane
Flow table flooding
Malformed control message injection
Data leakage
Table 2.5: SDN Attack Summary
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The controller emerges as a potential single point of attack. Attackers can
attack vulnerabilities of controllers and run several dangerous scripts. Therefore,
if there are no security settings to protect the controller, it would be under the
control of attackers. The controller provides an interface for SDN applications
to manage the network. However, this also gives chances for malicious SDN
applications to take over the network because of the lack of trust between the
controller and SDN applications. Malicious hosts also can cause severe damage
to the SDN architecture. Malicious hosts can perform Denial of Service (DoS) or
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks to controllers and other hosts. DoS
and DDoS attacks are some of the most dangerous attacks in SDN. It can be done
by flooding the network with a large number of forged packets. These packets
would trigger the switches to send a large number of requests to the controller for
new flow rules. Therefore the control channel bandwidth and the controller CPU
resources will be heavily consumed. As a result, the controller would respond
slowly to legitimate requests. At the same time, the switches would also suffer
from traffic congestion because the packets could quickly exhaust the memory of
the flow table storage in the switches. Compromised switches not only have the
same capabilities as the malicious hosts, but they are also capable of performing
more dynamic and severe attacks. Firstly, they can be used for traffic eavesdrop-
ping. Both data and control flows passing through the compromised switches can
be replicated and sent to the attacker for further processing. Furthermore, the
attacker can interfere with the control traffic passing through the compromised
switches to perform man-in-the-middle attacks. By doing so, the attacker can act
as the controller to some target switches.
The research in the field of SDN and general security in SDN is still in the
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early phase. Currently, there are several papers analyzing the security aspect
of SDN and proposing new security solutions in the SDN environment. Most
of them focus on the security analysis of SDN applications or network policy
verification.
2.2 Network Intrusion Detection System
Intrusion detection is the process of monitoring events occurring in a computer
or network and analysing them for signs of intrusion. These signs of interventions
can be referred to as anomalies. Anomalies can be put into three categories as
follows:
• Point Anomalies: A point anomaly is an object that is considerably
different from other data points.
• Collective Anomalies: If there are some linked objects observed as an
anomaly against other objects, then they are collective anomalies. Individ-
ually observed they might appear normal.
• Contextual Anomalies: If an object is abnormal viewed in a defined
context (e.g., temporal or spatial attribute), it is regarded as a contextual
anomaly.
An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is based on the hypothesis that an
intruder’s behaviour will be noticeably different from legitimate behaviour and
so it is detectable. The IDS identifies illegal behaviours or attacks and report on
them. The IDS has been studied for over 40 years since Anderson’s report [56].
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Basically, there are six types of intrusions: attempted break-ins, masquerade
attacks, penetration of the security control system, leakage, denial of service and
malicious user. An overview of an IDS is depicted in Figure 2.5.
Intrusion Detec-
tion System (IDS)
Classification
Intrusion Detection
Technique
NIDS
HIDS
Anomaly-based
Signature-
based
Figure 2.5: Overview of Intrusion Detection System
There are two popular types of IDS: network-based IDS (NIDS) and host-
based IDS (HIDS). In a host-based IDS, some applications will be installed on
the individual host or the device on the network and monitor the character of
the single host such as the integrity of the system, file changes, network traffics
and system logs. Host-based IDS can access information in the host so that it
can make more accurate decisions about attacks. However, this system can add
performance overheads to the host and thus degrade the overall performance. In
network-based IDS, the system will monitor all the network traffic and analyse
it for signs of intrusions. It tries to detect malicious activities such as DoS at-
tacks, DDoS attacks and other network attacks. Network-based IDS includes a
number of sensors to monitor packet traffic and a number of servers for network
management functions.
Based on what data is actually processed, the IDS can be categorized into
either signature-based detection or anomaly-based detection. Signature-based
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detection generally takes intrusion behaviour as patterns and establishes a signa-
ture database based on these known patterns. This method then monitors and
matches the user’s behaviour with the database to detect intrusion. Known at-
tacks can be detected well this way with a low false alarm rate. However, this
method cannot detect zero-day attacks which are new and unknown. On the
other hand, anomaly-based detection creates a normal behaviour baseline model
and then tries to identify any behaviour that deviates from this baseline model.
Thus, this method can detect zero-day attacks. The majority of current NIDSs
is signature-based IDS. There are several reasons for this reluctance to switch,
including the high false alarm rate, difficulty in obtaining reliable training data
and network dynamics.
In this thesis, we focus on the development of an anomaly-based Network In-
trusion Detection System (NIDS). One of the significant challenges of developing
a NIDS is ensuring robustness and effectiveness.
2.2.1 Signature-based Detection
Signature-based detection is the process of detecting packets that have a signature
(a pattern of known attacks) in the network traffic corresponding to the rules es-
tablished in the IDS. Well-written signature rules can perform detection of known
attacks with high probability and without mistake. Snort [57] is an open source
and well-known example of a signature-based IDS. A signature-based system is
at the heart of most commercial IDSs. In an IDS, there are typically at least
several thousand rules that are used for detecting potentially malicious attacks
and codes. These signatures also help network administrators easily recognize
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what kind of attack the system is under.
However, a signature-based detection system also has some drawbacks. It
cannot detect unknown attacks or known attacks with small variations, so the
database must be updated frequently. Many variations of one signature can also
make the database grow big and slow down the whole system. It also takes time
to create signatures for new exploits. A new attack must be analyzed before
developing any new signature to detect it. Attackers will take advantages of this
time-lapse, and this can cause serious problems. Therefore, IDS manufacturers
have to rush the signature to the market and update their systems regularly.
Signature-based IDS can also be bypassed when the attackers encrypt the code.
For a higher detection rate, signature-based detection is commonly combined
with packet-based detection. In packet-based detection, also named “Deep Packet
Inspection” (DPI), both header and payload of a packet are scanned to determine
whether a packet is an intrusion or not. All common kinds of known attacks
and intrusions can be detected with DPI if the data source delivers an entire
network packet for analysing. Header information is mainly helpful to detect
attacks aiming at vulnerabilities of the network stack. Payload information is used
for detecting attacks aiming at vulnerable applications. To process all payload
information, packet-based IDS requires a considerable amount of resources for
computation, and it is very time-consuming. These are the disadvantages of
packet-based IDS. Several researchers have expended much effort to design an
efficient packet-based IDS.
Signature-based intrusion detection systems are implemented using four tech-
niques: pattern matching techniques, rule-based techniques, data mining tech-
niques, and state-based techniques. Pattern matching techniques are commonly
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deployed on network intrusion detection systems. The attack patterns are usually
modelled based on packet headers, packet contents or both of them and then the
IDSs to match and identify them. Pattern matching is computationally expensive
since there are new types and varied forms of attacks emerging every day. A rule-
based technique is one of the earliest used methods for signature-based intrusion
detection. The intrusion scenarios are encoded as a set of rules, which are then
matched to a network or host traffic data. IDES [58] (Intrusion Detection Expert
System) is a rule-based system. IDES is trained to detect known intrusions, vul-
nerabilities. NIDES [59] (Next-generation Intrusion Detection Expert System)
is an extension of the IDES system. NIDES is a hybrid system that has both
a rule-based component and a statistical model component for anomaly detec-
tion. MIDAS [60] (Multics Intrusion Detection and Alerting System) is an expert
system that was developed to perform real-time intrusion detection and misuse
detection for Dockmaster, the National Computer Security Center (NCSC) net-
worked mainframe system. State-based techniques use system states and state
transitions to detect intrusions. They require finite state machine construction
for depicting the states and transitions. The states depict the IDS states, and
transitions characterize events that cause the IDS states to change.
2.2.2 Anomaly-based Detection
Anomaly-based detection is an alternative to signature-based detection. It uses
the tendency of the attack traffic to determine whether an attack is occurring
or not. It will compare definitions of normal activities against observed events
to find deviations. According to Maxion and Tan [61], “An anomaly is an event
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(or object) that differs from some standard or reference event, in excess of some
threshold, in accordance with some similarity or distance metric on the event”.
Anomaly-based IDS was originally proposed by Denning in her report [62]. It is
based on the idea that intrusion behaviors differ from legitimate behaviors and
are detectable.
A variety of techniques are used for anomaly detection. However, they can be
categorized into two main techniques: statistical analysis and ML. ML approaches
build models of normal data and then attempt to detect deviations from the
normal model in the observed data. ML approaches can be categorized into two
strategies: supervised learning and unsupervised learning. Supervised anomaly
detection algorithms require a set of labeled network data from which they train
their model. However, we do not have either labeled or purely normal data readily
available! We must deal with huge volumes of network data, and it is difficult to
classify it manually. If the data contains some mislabeled intrusions buried within
the training data, future instances of the attacks which will be assumed ”normal
data” and so may not be detected. We can obtain labeled data by simulating
intrusions, but then we would be limited to the set of known attacks. Thus
our detection system is restricted to identify only known attacks. Unsupervised
anomaly detection takes a set of unlabelled data as input and attempts to find
intrusions buried within the data. The basic idea is that since the intrusions
are both different from normal and rare, they will be detected as outliers in
the data. These algorithms have the major advantage of being able to process
unlabelled data and identify some of the intrusions. Anomaly-based IDS can
detect a variety of abnormal patterns such as attempted break-ins, DoS attacks,
worm, and scanning. This method can help detect unknown attacks, but it
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also has some disadvantages such as complexity, low detection rate, and a high
false alarm. Figure 2.6 shows some common ML techniques for classification of
intrusive and non-intrusive behavior.
Nowadays, with the constant increasing of network traffic and network speed,
it is challenging for traditional packet-based NIDSs to work well. In high-speed
environments, flow-based approaches are introduced as a way to solve this prob-
lem. A flow is a set of IP packets that have a set of common properties. The
common properties are called flow keys which are the source and destination ad-
dresses, source and destination port numbers and IP protocol. The NIDS looks
at aggregated information of related packets of network traffic in the form of flow,
so the amount of the data to be analyzed is reduced, and network overhead is
minimized. The flows provide information about the network connection, which
can be represented in a few bytes, to be analyzed rather than packet payload.
Flow-based supports anomaly-based NIDS to have the ability to detect anomalies.
Flow-based methods focus mostly on DoS attack, scan, worm, and viruses.
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Researchers have employed classical ML approaches such as Support Vector Ma-
chine (SVM), K-Nearest Neighbour (KNN), artificial neural networks (ANNs),
and Random Forest for intrusion detection for several years. These proposed
methods have achieved various degrees of success while also exhibiting some in-
herent limitations. These techniques had a quite high false alarm rate and asso-
ciated computational cost as mentioned in [19]. Researchers have adopted these
techniques for intrusion detection under the context of SDN. For anomaly-based
detection approaches, SOM and SVM are frequently used because of their high
detection accuracy. Braga et al. [63] present a lightweight approach using a Self
Organizing Map (SOM) to detect Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks
in the SDN. This approach based on six traffic flow features (Average of Packets
per flow, Average of Bytes per flow, Average of Duration per flow, Percentage of
Pair-flows, Growth of Single-flows, Growth of Different Ports) gives a quite high
detection accuracy. Nam et al. [64] propose an approach combining SOM and K-
Nearest Neighbors to detect several kinds of DDoS attacks in SDN. This approach
can reduce computational overheads while maintaining a suitable ACC of 98.24%.
In [14], the authors use four traffic anomaly detection algorithms (threshold ran-
dom walk with credit-based rate limiting, rate limiting, maximum entropy and
NETAD) in the SDN environments. The experiments indicate that these algo-
rithms perform better in the SOHO (Small Office/Home Office) network than in
the ISP (Internet Service Provider) and they can work at line rates without in-
troducing any new performance overhead for the home network. In [17] and [18],
SVM is introduced to detect DDoS attacks quite efficiently. Winter et al. [65]
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train a one-class SVM with a malicious dataset in order to reduce the false alarm
rate. K-Nearest Neighbour and graph theory are combined to classify DDoS at-
tacks from benign flows in SDNs by AlEroud et al. in [66]. In [16], Mukherjee et
al. investigated the combination of Correlation-based Feature Selection, Informa-
tion Gain and Gain Ratio for feature reduction. Then the reduced dataset was
classified by a Naive Bayes algorithm that yields an accuracy of 97.78%. Javaid
et al. [67] used a self-taught learning algorithm on the NSL-KDD dataset for
intrusion detection. They used soft-max regression as a classifier and achieved
an accuracy of 92.98%. Gabriel et al. [68] combined neural networks and danger
theory for DDoS attack resiliency.
Entropy is used to detect DDoS attacks quite effectively in [15], [69] and [70].
S. M. Mousavi proposed in [15] an early detection method for the DDoS attacks
against the SDN controller. This method is based on the entropy variation of
the data flows’ destination IP addresses. It assumes that the destination IP
addresses are evenly distributed in the normal flows, while the malicious flows are
destined for a small number of hosts. The entropy will drop dramatically when an
attack happens. In [69], a distributed algorithm for entropy-based DDoS attack
detection is introduced to reduce the communication overhead. Trung et al. [71]
combined hard thresholds of detection and a fuzzy inference system to detect
the risk of DDoS attacks based on the real traffic characteristics (Distribution of
Inter-arrival Time, Distribution of Packet Quantity per Flow and Flow Quantity
to a Sever) under normal and attack states. In order to improve the scalability
of the native OpenFlow protocol, a combination of OpenFlow and sFlow had
been proposed in [72] for effective and scalable anomaly detection and mitigation
mechanism in an SDN environment. SPHINX was introduced in [73] to detect
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both known and potentially unknown attacks within an SDN by leveraging the
novel abstraction of flow graphs, which closely approximate the actual network
operations.
Recently, DL has developed as an important research trend in the field of
intrusion detection. Yin et al. [74] propose a DL approach using recurrent neural
networks for detection intrusion. They got an accuracy of 83.28% with their
experiments on the NSL-KDD dataset. Fu et al. [75] propose an IDS using Long
short term memory RNN (LSTM-RNN). They achieved an accuracy of 97.52%
with the NSL-KDD dataset. An autoencoder (AE) - a form of Artificial Neural
Network - is extensively exploited by many researchers for anomaly detection in
SDNs. Zhang et al. [76] propose a method combining Sparse Autoencoder and
Xgboost algorithms to deal with a high-dimensional and unlabelled dataset. They
achieve an F1-measure of 91.97%, but their precision is still quite low compared
to other state-of-the-art approaches. In [77], the authors propose a DL based
approach using a stacked autoencoder (SAE) for detecting DDoS attacks in the
SDN. A Non-symmetric deep AE and Random Forest algorithm are combined
to detect DDoS attacks in [78]. The authors claim that they can obtain a good
classification result whilst significantly reducing the training time.
Nowadays, current research trends focus on detecting DDoS attacks which are
some of the most dangerous attacks in SDNs. The controller is a single point of
failure in the SDN architecture. Therefore, if intruders trigger the DDoS attacks
on the controller and take control of it, they can also control the whole network.
In this thesis, our approach aims to detect all types of attacks and discover zero-
day attacks in SDNs.
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The performance and effectiveness of the NIDS are evaluated by several metrics.
A confusion matrix is a table that is often used to describe the performance of
the NIDS. A binary confusion matrix is described in Table 2.6.
Predicted Classes
Anomaly Legitimate
Actual Classes
Anomaly True Positive (TP) False Negative (FN)
Legitimate False Positive (FP) True Negative (TN)
Table 2.6: A Binary Confusion Matrix
• TP: the number of anomaly records correctly classified.
• TN: the number of normal records correctly classified.
• FP: the number of normal records incorrectly classified.
• FN: the number of anomaly record incorrectly classified.
For the evaluation purpose, Accuracy (ACC), Precision (P), Recall (R) and
F1-measure (F1) metrics are applied. These metrics are calculated as follows:
• Accuracy (ACC): shows the percentage of true detection over total traffic
trace,
ACC =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
× 100%. (2.1)
• Precision (P): shows how many intrusions predicted by a NIDS are actual
intrusions. The higher P then the lower false alarm is:
P =
TP
TP + FP
× 100%. (2.2)
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• Recall (R): shows the percentage of predicted intrusions versus all intru-
sions presented. We want a high R value,
R =
TP
TP + FN
× 100%. (2.3)
• F1-measure (F1): gives a better measure of the accuracy of a NIDS by
considering both the precision (P) and the recall (R). We also aim for a
high F value,
F1 =
2
1
P
+ 1
R
× 100%. (2.4)
A Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve is also used to evaluate the
detection performance. The ROC curve is created by plotting False Positive Rate
(FPR) against True Positive Rate (TPR). The FPR and TPR are calculated as
follows:
FPR =
FP
FP + TN
× 100%. (2.5)
TPR =
TP
FP + TN
× 100%. (2.6)
The area under the ROC curve (AUC) is a standard measure for classifier
comparison. The higher the AUC, then the better is the performance of the
method. Figure 2.7 shows an example of the ROC curve in which the AUC is the
area below the yellow curve. In practice, we expect to get high AUC and TPR
values.
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Figure 2.7: The ROC Curve Example. The closer the ROC curve to the top
left corner, the better the result is
2.5 SDN-based NIDS: An Example
In this section, we present a simple example of SDN-based NIDS to show the
flexibility of SDN in network monitoring and detecting intrusions. As mentioned
in the previous sections, the DoS attack is one of the most severe attacks in the
SDN. During the DoS attack, many spoofed packets with fake source IP addresses
are sent to one host or one specific destination IP address. Therefore, in this
experiment, we monitor one type of network information that is the IP destination
addresses. As described in the previous section, any unmatched packet will be
sent to the SDN controller for routing advice. The IP destination address will be
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extracted from PACKET IN messages sent to the SDN controller.
Entropy is commonly used to detect randomness. The less the randomness is,
the less the entropy is and vice versa. Therefore, entropy-based approaches have
significant advantages in DoS attack detection ( [15], [69], [70]). When legitimate
traffic is sent in a network, the entropy values are relatively close and smooth. In
the case of DoS attacks, the entropy values will drop significantly when a large
number of packets are attacking one host or a subnet of hosts.
Let I be a set of destination IP addresses and let W be the window containing
a packets’ destination IP address x and the occurrence number y. Then, the
probability of xi happening in W is pi and the entropy is denoted as H.
I = {x1, x2, x3, ....., xn} (2.7)
W = {(x1, y1) , (x2, y2) , (x3, y3) , ......, (xn, yn)} (2.8)
pi =
yi
n
(2.9)
H = −
n∑
i=1
pi log pi (2.10)
The entropy will be at its maximum if all elements have equal probabilities.
If an element appears more than others, the entropy will be lower. As mentioned
above, a non-match packet will be sent to the controller for further processing. In
DoS attacks, hackers usually use spoofed IP packets so that these packets will be
sent to the SDN controller for forwarding advice. The controller can calculate the
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entropy with information extracted from these packets and detect DoS attacks.
2.5.1 Experimental Setup
In this experiment, Mininet [79] is used to virtualize a complete SDN network.
Mininet is an open-source network emulator which runs a collection of end-hosts,
switches, routers and links on a single Linux kernel. A large network with different
topologies can be emulated and tested with Mininet. Mininet network behaves
just like a real network, so the code developed in Mininet can be applied to any
real network. Mininet also supports OpenFlow version 1.0, so it is quite easy
for us to do SDN experiments. In this experiment, a small scale network with 1
controller, 9 switches and 64 hosts is emulated by Mininet (see Figure 2.8). A
POX controller [35], which is written in Python, is used in this experiment to
control the emulated SDN network and collect network information. Scapy [80]
is used here for packets and spoofing IP address generation.
Figure 2.8: The Emulated Network Topology
As seen in Figure 2.8, all the OpenFlow switches are controlled by the POX
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controller (c0). The POX controller controls traffic flows between hosts in the
emulated network.
In all test cases, Scapy sends randomly 4000 UDP packets to 64 hosts in
the network to create legitimate traffic. DoS attacks are generated by Scapy by
sending 500 UDP packets to a single host (i.e., 10.0.0.1) in the network. Every
50 PACKET IN messages will be parsed for their destination IP address, and the
entropy of the list will be computed. Normal traffic is run on all switches with
randomly generated packets going to all hosts. Attack traffic is run manually
from one host. Each test case was run ten times to get mean values. Two types
of attack rate are tested in this experiment.
• In the first test case, an attack with 25% rate attack is performed. This
results in having about 12 attack packets in a window of 50 packets.
• In the second test case, an attack with 75% rate attack is performed. This
results in having about 39 attack packets in a window of 50 packets.
2.5.2 Simulation Results
In this section, we examine the result of the attack. Figure 2.9 is a result of
10 runs with 4000 packets per test. Each point on the horizontal axis shows a
window of 50 packets and the vertical axis indicates the entropy for that window.
The graph’s data are the mean values over ten runs.
In Figure 2.9, the differences among legitimate, 25% rate attack and 75%
rate attack traffic are shown clearly. When the DoS attack begins, the entropy
starts dropping and remains quite low during the attack. The entropy drops
significantly so that we can identify the time and duration of the attack easily.
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Comparing the 25% rate attack and 75% rate attack entropies, it can be seen that
the entropy drops deeper. The window of the attack is also narrower compared to
25% rate DoS attack. Because of the increase of the attack rate, the randomness
of the attacked IP address decreases and the entropy drops dramatically. In this
graph, we can see that legitimate and attack traffic are significantly different from
each other. A threshold which is 1.3 can be set for attack detection. With this
threshold, all attack packets can be detected with 100% detection rate.
Figure 2.9: Entropy Comparision for Legitimate, 25% Rate DDoS Attack and
75% Rate Attack Traffic
The entropy method is quite lightweight and flexible for detecting some sim-
ple networks attacks but it cannot detect more complex attacks. Although the
entropy algorithm can identify the attack patterns, there are some benign net-
work anomalies, which affect the network metrics in the same way of malicious
anomalies. For example, a Flash Crowd anomaly would cause a massive drop
in the destination IP and destination port metric, like a DDoS. These benign
network anomalies can increase the false positive rate of the detection system. In
another case, Slow DDoS attacks can be performed by attackers. These attacks
45
2.6 Conclusion
use slow traffic that mimics legitimate traffic, so they are tough to detect and
mitigate. Besides, choosing a proper hard threshold is also a big problem for this
method. It requires significant pre-knowledge about the network to decide the
alarm threshold. Network traffic is dynamic and constantly changing so the hard
threshold cannot detect attacks effectively.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we discussed in detail the SDN architecture and the OpenFlow
protocol. Some major security concerns in the SDN architecture are also pre-
sented in this chapter. This chapter also provided an overview of the NIDS and
some related work in SDNs. The flow-based NIDS will be focused as the primary
research of the thesis. We describe and explain the use of some metrics in evalu-
ating the performance of the DL algorithm as well as the NIDS. At the end of this
chapter, we introduced an example of SDN-based NIDS to show the flexibility of
the SDN paradigm in monitoring and detecting network attacks.
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Deep Learning
The DL overview is introduced for easy understanding of this thesis. In
addition, we also introduce the evaluation methodology and the network
datasets used in this thesis.
In This Chapter:
3.1 Notations
Throughout this thesis, we use the following mathematical notations. In general,
the following rules are used for number and arrays:
• Non-bold letters (e.g., x, y, I) are for scalars.
• Bold small letters (e.g., w) denote column vectors. A row vector is denoted
by its transpose (e.g., wT ).
• Bold capital letters (e.g., W) denote matrices.
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In recent years, DL has emerged as one of the hottest technologies and somewhat
of a buzzword. So what is DL? And what is the difference between Artificial
Intelligent (AI), ML and DL? Figure 3.1 shows the relationship of these terms.
As we can see, DL is a subset of ML, and then ML is a subset of AI.
Figure 3.1: The AI, ML and DL Relationships [5]
AI is a broad concept that means incorporating human intelligence into ma-
chines. The intention of ML is to give machines the ability to learn and make
decisions by themselves using the provided data. ML was inspired by the struc-
ture and function of the human brain which is a highly interconnected system of
neurons. A neuron is a basic computational unit of the human brain. Figure 3.2
shows a drawing of a biological neuron and how it works in practice. The neuron
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receives input signals from its dendrites and then produces output signals through
its axon. The axon connects to dendrites of other neurons, so the output signals
of this neuron will become the input signals of the others.
Figure 3.2: A Drawing of a Biological Neuron [6]
A common model of an artificial neuron is described in Figure 3.3. The
artificial neuron also receives inputs and then computes an output as the human
neuron.
x2 w2 Σ f
Activate
function
y
Output
x1 w1
xn wn
Weights
Bias
b
Inputs
Figure 3.3: The Single Artificial Neuron Structure
The working of a neuron can be presented mathematically as in Equation 3.1.
49
3.2 Introduction
y(x) = f(wTx + b), (3.1)
where f(·) is a non-linearity activation function, w is a weight vector, x is an
input vector and b is a bias. Table 3.1 shows some of the most common activation
functions.
Function f(x) Definition Range
Sigmoid
1
1 + e−x
(0,1)
Tanh
ex − e−x
ex + e−x
(-1,1)
Rectified Linear Units (ReLU) max(0, x) (0,∞)
Table 3.1: Definitions of Activation Function
The history of ML development can be dated back to 1957 with an intro-
duction of the perceptron learning algorithm by Frank Rosenblatt. However,
this perceptron algorithm could not solve some simple non-linear problems at
that time. This lead to a period of time called “The first AI Winter”. In 1986,
the Multi-layer Perceptron (MLP), which is a neural network with many hidden
layers, was introduced in [81] to solve non-linear problems. The MLP attracted
many researchers at that time, but several problems like lack of processing power,
lack of data, overfitting and vanishing gradient prevented the development of the
MLP. Besides, traditional MLP algorithms are limited in their ability to process
raw data. Considerable domain expertise is required to design features as inputs
for the MLP system. Despite some achievements in this period, “The second AI
Winter” happened, and many researchers changed their focus to Kernel Machine
methods like Support Vector Machine. In 2012, Convolutional Neural Networks
50
3.2 Introduction
(CNN) were introduced in [82] and have had achieved many achievements since
then [21] [83] [84].
In general, DL is an ML approach. DL algorithms use a neural network (NN)
to learn associations between inputs and outputs. DL refers to creating a deep
NN (DNN) that has a huge amount of hidden layers. The NN consists of several
artificial neurons arranged in a series of layers. The most common type of the
NN is a fully-connected NN in which neurons between two adjacent layer are fully
connected. A basic structure of the fully-connected NN can be seen in Figure 3.4.
x1
x2
x3
h1
h2
h3
h4
h5
h6
yˆ1
yˆ2
Input
layer
Hidden
layer
Output
layer
W1 W2
Figure 3.4: The NN Architecture with an Input Layer, a Hidden Layer and an
Output Layer
The first layer, known as the input layer, receives information (x1, x2, x3) from
the outside environment for the learning process. On the opposite side, the last
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layer of the NN, known as the output layer, gives us responses (y1, y2) to the
learned information. In between the input and output layers are hidden layers.
The connection from one neuron to another is represented by a number called a
weight.
The DL algorithm can be categorized into different types based on its ar-
chitectural designs. Figure 3.5 presents an overview of DL algorithms that are
categorized into two categories: Generative and Discriminate Architectures.
DL Algorithms
Generative
Architectures
Discriminate
Architectures
Deep Belief Network
(DBN)
Deep Boltzmann Machine
(DBM)
Recurrent Neural Network
(RNN)
Deep Auto Encoder
(DAE)
Recurrent Neural Network
(RNN)
Convolutional Neural Net-
work (CNN)
Figure 3.5: Overview of The DL Algorithm
The DL yields state-of-the-art results for a wide range of applications such as
speech recognition [20], natural language processing [22], and image classification
[82]. The success of DL has been facilitated by several factors: better hardware
including GPUs, bigger datasets, better regularization and optimization methods.
The DL algorithm is expected to improve the field of intrusion detection.
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DL has the ability to learn high-level representations automatically from raw
data, while ML requires handcrafted features as input. Each layer in a DNN is a
non-linear module that transforms the representation at one layer to a more com-
plex/abstract level. By that way, very complex functions can be learned. With
the development of the DL, we now no longer spend time for feature engineering
and focus on optimizing the DNN architecture. This is one of the main benefits
of DL over traditional ML algorithms. The difference between the ML and the
DL is depicted in Figure 3.6.
Figure 3.6: The Difference Between Traditional ML and DL Algorithms
However, DL also has several disadvantages as follows:
• DL algorithms require much more data than traditional ML algorithms.
• DL algorithms are computationally expensive. DL needs high-performance
hardware and much more time to train compared to traditional ML algo-
rithms.
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• DL is a “Black Box” in nature. It means that we cannot explain what
happens inside the DNN and how it comes up with its outputs.
3.4 Styles of Learning
ML/DL algorithms can be categorized into two groups by their learning style as
follows:
• Supervised Learning: Input data or training data has a known label
associated with each sample. Given a set of data points {x1, x2, ..., xn}
associated to a set of outcomes {y1, y2, ..., yn}, we want to build a classifier
that learn how to predict y from x. During the training process, an ML/DL
model will be optimized to minimize the distance (or error) between the
known label and the predicted label.
• Unsupervised Learning: Input data or training data does not have any
known label. Given a set of unlabeled data points {x1, x2, ..., xn}, we want
to find hidden patterns of the data. During the training process, an ML/DL
model will try to learn structures, patterns or general rules of the input data.
3.5 Training and Testing Neural Networks
One of the most common forms of ML/DL is supervised learning. The NN train-
ing process of supervised learning can be separated into six steps as follows:
• Collecting and Processing Training Data: Training data is a crucial
part of preparing for the training process. All the collected data must be
cleaned, normalized and labeled.
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• Defining the NN Architecture: The number of neurons at each layer
must be determined at this step. For the input layer, the number of neurons
is picked based on the size of input data (features). The number of neurons
at the output layer represents the class label of the training data. The
number of hidden layers and the number of neurons in each hidden layer can
be varied to find the best architecture for each task. There is no architecture
that fits for all different tasks.
• Feed forward Process: Given a training set {(x1,y1), ..., (xp,yp)} con-
sisting of p ordered pairs of n− andm−dimensional vectors, which are called
the inputs and outputs. The input xi is fed into the NN and propagated
through the network to compute the output yˆi. Referring to Figure 3.4, the
output yˆi can be computed by
h = f(W1xi), (3.2)
yˆi = f(W
2h), (3.3)
where f(·) is a nonlinearity function, and W1 and W2 are weight matrices.
During the training process of supervised learning, a loss function is intro-
duced to compute the distance (or error) between the predicted output and
the desired output. The most common loss function is the Mean Square
Error (MSE) which is computed in Equation 3.4.
MSE =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(yi − yˆi)2, (3.4)
where N is the number of observations, yi and yˆi are the true and predicted
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values respectively.
• Backpropagation Process: The goal of the training process is to min-
imize the loss function by modifying the NN’s internal adjustable param-
eters (or weights). Let J(W,b,X,Y) is a loss function in which W is a
weight matrix, b is a bias vector, and X,Y are matrices of input and out-
put samples respectively. The gradient is computed by the backpropagation
procedure [81] which uses the chain rule to compute the derivative. In prac-
tice, a stochastic gradient descent (SGD) is a commonly used optimization
algorithm to compute errors, gradients and then adjust the weights. The
weight will be adjusted in the opposite direction to the gradient vector as in
Equation 3.5. For a large dataset, computing the loss and gradient over the
whole dataset is infeasible. Therefore, in practice, data is normally divided
into small batches for training.
Wt+1 = Wt − α ∂J
∂Wt
, (3.5)
where α is a scalar variable called learning rate.
The weight is computed and updated backwards from the output layer to
the input layer. That is the reason why it is called backpropagation.
• Validation Process: After training, another set of samples (testing set)
is used to evaluate the trained model performance. This testing set is not
used for training. Thus, the model performance on the testing set shows
the generalization of then trained model. It is expected to achieve high
accuracy on both training and testing sets.
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• Hyper-parameter Tuning: All parameters like learning rate, batch size,
number of neurons, and number of layers are termed as hyper-parameters.
After the validation process, hyper-parameters can be tuned to achieve
better performance for the NN. Tuning network hyper-parameters is a quite
challenging task and is one of the main research of the DL. Choosing the
learning rate is an important step in the training process. It takes a lot
of time and many experiments to decide the best learning rate for each
problem.
During the training process, we usually have to encounter an overfitting prob-
lem. Overfitting happens when the model tries to fit all the training data in-
cluding noise (see Figure 3.7). As a result, the trained model performs well on
the training data but very poor with new data. In order to solve this problem,
several techniques have been introduced such as regularizer, dropout, and early
stopping. Dropout technique is one of the most common methods among them.
A predefined percentage of NN will be terminated randomly at each epoch in
Dropout technique.
Figure 3.8 describes the complete training and testing processes of ML/DL
algorithms.
3.6 Network Datasets
Anomaly detection techniques require large numbers of existing benign and sus-
picious activities to build detection models. Currently, there are only a few pub-
lic datasets available for intrusion detection evaluation (e.g., the KDD Cup 99
dataset [85], the NSL-KDD dataset [86], DAPRA [87], the ISCX 2012 Intrusion
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Figure 3.7: The green line represents an overfitted model, and the black line
represents a regularized model. While the green line best follows the training
data, it is too dependent on that data, and it is likely to have a higher error rate
on new unseen data, compared to the black line [7]
Detection [88] and the CICIDS2017 dataset [89]). In this thesis, the NSL-KDD
and CICIDS2017 datasets are chosen for evaluation purposes.
3.6.1 NSL-KDD Dataset
Among the above datasets, the KDD Cup 99 dataset and the NSL-KDD dataset
have been commonly used in the literature to assess the performance of NIDSs.
The KDD Cup 99 dataset is one of the most popular datasets and is widely
applied to evaluate the performance of intrusion detection systems. However,
this dataset suffers from the redundancy of records that makes the classifier fail
to deliver better accuracy. The NSL-KDD dataset is introduced by Tavallaee et
al. to resolve this redundancy issue.
SDNs are a new environment, and so the dataset for them are still very rare
and unpublished. The NSL-KDD dataset is still considered as a state-of-the-art
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Figure 3.8: ML/DL Training and Testing Phase
dataset by many researchers to evaluate their approaches, and so we also choose it
for our experiment. This dataset contains 125,973 records for training and 22,544
records for testing. Details about the distribution of this dataset are presented
in Table 3.2. The number of legitimate and anomaly traffic is balanced to make
sure that the ML/DL algorithms can be trained properly.
Dataset Legitimate Traffic Anomaly Traffic
KDDTrain+ 67,343 58,630
KDDTest+ 9,711 12,833
Table 3.2: The NSL-KDD Dataset Distribution
Each traffic sample in this dataset has 41 network features (see Table 3.3) that
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are categorized into three types of features: basic features (1 - 9), content-based
features (10 - 22) and traffic-based features (23 - 41). The details of these features
can be found in [86].
No. Feature Name No. Feature Name
1 Duration 22 Is guest login
2 Protocol type 23 Count
3 Service 24 Serror rate
4 Flag 25 Rerror rate
5 Src bytes 26 Same srv rate
6 Dst bytes 27 Diff srv rate
7 Land 28 Srv count
8 Wrong fragment 29 Srv serror rate
9 Urgent 30 Srv rerror rate
10 Hot 31 Srv diff host rate
11 Num failed logins 32 Dst host count
12 Logged in 33 Dst host srv count
13 Num compromised 34 Dst host same srv rate
14 Root shell 35 Dst host diff srv rate
15 Su attempted 36 Dst host same src port rate
16 Num root 37 Dst host srv diff host rate
17 Num file creations 38 Dst host serror rate
18 Num shells 39 Dst host srv error rate
19 Num access files 40 Dst host error rate
20 Num outbound cmds 41 Dst host srv rerror rate
21 Is host login
Table 3.3: The NSL-KDD Dataset Features
Attacks in the dataset are divided into four categories according to their char-
acteristics. The details of each category are described in Table 3.4. Some specific
attack types (written in bold) in the testing set do not appear in the training set,
and that makes the detection task more realistic.
The DNN requires each record in the input data to be represented as a vector
of real numbers. Thus, every symbolic feature in a dataset is first converted into
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Category Training Set Testing Set
DoS back, land, neptune, pod,
smurf, teardrop
back, land, neptune, pod,
smurf, teardrop, mail-
bomb, processtable,
udpstorm, apache2,
worm
R2L fpt-write, guess-passwd,
imap, multihop, phf, spy,
warezclient, warezmaster
fpt-write, guess-passwd,
imap, multihop, phf,
spy, warezmaster, xlock,
xsnoop, snmpguess, sn-
mpgetattack, httptun-
nel, sendmail, named
U2R buffer-overflow, loadmod-
ule, perl, rootkit
buffer-overflow, load-
module, perl, rootkit,
sqlattack, xterm, ps
Probe ipsweep, nmap, portsweep,
satan
ipsweep, nmap, portsweep,
satan, mscan, saint
Table 3.4: Attacks in The NSL-KDD Dataset
a numerical value. The NSL-KDD dataset contains both numerical and symbolic
features. These symbolic features include the type of protocol (TCP, UDP, and
ICMP), the service type and the TCP status flag. After converting all symbolic
attributes into numerical values, every feature within each record is normalized
by the respective maximum value and therefore falls into the same range of [0-1]
by Min-Max scaling. Its mathematical equation is given as:
x
′
=
x−min(x)
max(x)−min(x) , (3.6)
where x
′
is the normalized value, and x is the original value.
In Table 3.5, we give some examples of the NSL-KDD dataset for more un-
derstanding.
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3.6.2 CICIDS2017 Dataset
As mentioned in [89], most of the current network dataset are out-of-date and not
reliable enough, so the CICIDS2017 dataset was proposed as a new benchmark
dataset. The CICIDS2017 dataset is claimed to be most updated with all common
attacks and real-world traffic. This dataset covers seven types of common attack
families (i.e., Brute Force Attack, Heatbleed Attack, Botnet, DoS Attack, DDoS
Attack, Web Attack, and Infiltration Attack). This dataset contains seven small
datasets with different attack scenarios. All of these datasets are labeled and
saved in CSV format. Each flow sample in the CICIDS2017 dataset contains 80
flow features which are defined and explained in detail in [90].
In this thesis, we choose Wednesday and Friday datasets focusing on DoS,
Heartblead, Slowloris, Slowhttptest, Hulk, GoldenEye, and DDoS attacks. These
types of attacks are on the rise and are major threats to the SDN architecture.
The Wednesday dataset will be used for training and testing purposes. The Friday
dataset will be used for testing purposes only. The details of each dataset are
described in Table. 3.6.
Dataset Legitimate Traffic Anomaly Traffic
Wednesday Dataset 439,683 251,723
Friday Dataset 183,877 41,834
Table 3.6: The CICIDS2017 Dataset Description
This dataset is also normalized into the range of [0-1] by the Min-Max scaling
as Equation 3.6.
In Table 3.7, we give some examples of the CICIDS2017 dataset for more
understanding.
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3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented some background knowledge about the DL.
The process of training and testing the DNN has been demonstrated to make
the work in this thesis clearer and easier to understand. In the last section of
this chapter, network datasets that are used to train the DL algorithm are also
introduced in this chapter.
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Chapter4
DeepIDS: Deep Learning
Approach for Intrusion Detection
in Software Defined Networking
An SDN-based NIDS is introduced with three core modules: The Collec-
tor, The Anomaly Detector and The Counter Measure Deployment. In this
chapter, we focus on developing the Anomaly Detector module in which DL
algorithms are implemented. We evaluate the potential of DL in detecting
network anomaly with different learning rates and feature sets. Experimen-
tal results show that a simple DNN can detect network anomalies effectively
with just some basic network features. Network overheads are an important
factor when designing the NIDS, so they are also evaluated in detail in this
chapter.
In This Chapter:
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4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 Motivation
The SDN architecture decouples the network control and forwarding functions
enabling the network control to become directly programmable and the under-
lying infrastructure to be abstracted for applications and network services. The
SDN controller is centralized and separated from its underlying switches, and so
it simplifies network management and facilitates network evolution. Instead of
deploying a hardware-based NIDS as in the traditional network, we can imple-
ment a software-based NIDS on the SDN controller and then take the advantages
of SDNs. We can now collect network information, detect any sign of intrusions
and then deploy a flow rule to mitigate attacks in a real-time manner. Consider-
ing the success of DL in many fields [20] [22] [82], a combination of SDN and DL
can improve the NIDS performance and then secure the network better.
In this chapter, we present the structural design and implementation of DeepIDS
(a flow-based anomaly detection system using DL) in the SDN architecture. The
attack detection mechanism is the main research contribution of this chapter. A
comparison with several machine learning algorithms proves the enhancements
offered by our approach.
4.1.2 Contribution
Our main contributions are summarized in the following points:
• We propose and implement an SDN-based NIDS with three core modules:
The Collector, The Anomaly Detector and The Counter Measure Deploy-
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ment.
• We have implemented a Deep Neural Network (DNN) model in DeepIDS.
We trained and evaluated the model with different sets of features of the
NSL-KDD dataset [86]. Through experiments, our model yields a detection
ACC of 80.7% using just six basic network features among the 41 features
of this dataset.
• This method is scalable, and the structure of the DNN can be changed
according to the characteristic of the data features, which makes our method
applicable to detect other kinds of attack.
• We have also evaluated the network performance of DeepIDS in the SDN
environment. We implemented our DeepIDS in a POX controller, and stress
tested DeepIDS through extensive simulation. The test results demonstrate
that our approach does not degrade the POX controller’s performance.
4.1.3 Chapter Organization
This chapter is structured as follows: In Section 4.2, we present the implemen-
tation details of the proposed DeepIDS with respect to data gathering, anomaly
detection and mitigation. The experimental methodology is introduced in Section
4.3. Section 4.4 presents the detection performance of our DL approach. Sec-
tion 4.5 describes our network performance evaluation experiments and results.
Finally, Section 4.6 concludes the work.
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4.2 DeepIDS System Architecture
In this section, we propose an SDN-based NIDS architecture (DeepIDS) as de-
picted in Figure 4.1. Our DeepIDS consists of three main modules: the Collector,
the Anomaly Detector and the Counter Measure Deployment. The DeepIDS is
written in Python programming language and deployed as an application in the
SDN controller.
Data Plane
Control Plane
SDN Controller
The Collector
The Anomaly 
Detector The Counter 
Measure 
Deployment
OFP.FLOW_STATS_REQUESTOFP.FLOW_STATS_REPLY OFP.FLOW_MOD
Network Traffic
DeepIDS
Figure 4.1: The DeepIDS Architecture
The DeepIDS is designed to fulfil the following properties:
• Flexibility: The DeepIDS is developed as an application for ease of de-
ployment, configuration and interaction. It can be implemented on top
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of any SDN controller. Our DL models can be modified and optimized
based on network requirements. New threat models can also be easily
added/updated.
• Scalability: The DeepIDS is designed with a goal to facilitate not only small
scale networks but also large scale networks. The overhead of our approach
does not degrade the performance of the whole network. The overhead on
the SDN controller is evaluated with different network sizes.
For ease of understanding, details of the network intrusion detection frame-
work are presented in Figure 4.2. This framework describes a complete cycle of
data flow in the DeepIDS.
Network Traffic
Data Collection
Feature Extraction
Labelling
Network Dataset
Training Set Testing Set
DL Algorithms
Intrusion 
Detection 
Predictor
No Attack 
Detected
Attack Detected
The Counter 
Measure 
Deployment
The Anomaly Detector
T
h
e 
C
o
ll
ec
to
r
Network Intrusion Detection Framework (DeepIDS)
Offline Training Online Detection
Figure 4.2: Network Intrusion Detection Framework
At the first stage of the intrusion detection process, The Collector collects
network information and then extracts flow features from them. These flow fea-
tures are inputs of the DL algorithm. Some examples of flow features are shown
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in Table 4.1. For the DL algorithm training purpose, these flow features will be
cleaned, labeled and saved as a network dataset.
No. Flow Feature
1 Source IP Address
2 Destination IP Address
3 Source Port
4 Destination Port
5 Number of Flow per Second
6 Number of Packet per Second
7 Packet Duration
8 Bytes per Packet
Table 4.1: Flow Feature Examples
After preparing the network dataset, we will move to the second stage which
is the most critical part of intrusion detection and also is the primary research
of this thesis. At this stage, we will train the DL algorithm to detect all types
of network attacks. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the network dataset will be
separated into two subsets: Training Set and Testing Set. The training set will
be used for training, and the testing set will be used for evaluating trained models.
If there is any attack detected, the Counter Measure Deployment module will be
activated to mitigate the attack.
4.2.1 The Collector
We consider network traffic logs as a time series. For each time interval in a
series, we extract various per-flow information. Based on this information, flows
transferred during each time interval are classified. For this reason, the analysed
time period is divided into equal overlapping time bins of length T . The length
of each time bin should be selected in such a manner that it contains enough
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information to detect anomalies. Notice also that the optimal selection of the
detection loop period is a complex problem. If the selected period is too large,
then the response time will be long, which makes the controller and the switches
handle an enormous amount of attack packets and even destroys the controller
and the switches. If the period is too small, the attack detection will occur
more frequently, which incurs significant overheads for the controller in terms of
resource efficiency. While several researchers [91] - [92] focus on traffic monitoring
and sampling, this is not the main focus of our work in this thesis. In this thesis,
we are focusing on improving the anomaly detection rate. In addition, because of
a lack of network facilities, most of the experiment at the early stage of this work
are done in an oﬄine manner. All the ML/DL models are trained and tested
with pulished datasets. Therefore, we are not focusing on this process now.
Currently, most approaches use the periodic trigger to start the detection of
the attack based on inspection of flow entries, whereby, the collection of flow
entries is performed at predetermined time intervals by the controller. It is hard
to choose the time interval, but the system also gives the network manager the
right to change that time interval to suit the network. In our experiment, the
time interval is set at T = 1 second for stress testing the controller.
The Collector module is responsible for collecting flow information and pe-
riodically exporting it to the Anomaly Detector module. The OpenFlow pro-
tocol provides us with a proactive way to collect network information. An
OFP FLOW STATS REQUEST message will be sent to all switches by the con-
troller after a fixed time-window to request the network statistics. The OpenFlow
switches will reply with an OFP FLOW STATS REPLY message. All the statis-
tics in the OFP FLOW STATS REPLY message will be extracted and recorded
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by the Collector module. The 6-tuple basic feature willbe prepared as an input
for the DL model in the Anomaly Detector module.
4.2.2 The Anomaly Detector
Data produced by the Collector is subsequently fed to the Anomaly Detector. In
this module, we choose the DL algorithm as a core of the module. The DL model
can be trained oﬄine and can be deployed for online detection. In addition, we
can update our model anytime without interfering with real-time detection. For
every time-window, the Anomaly Detector module inspects all the flow entries
to identify any potential attack traffic. As soon as an anomaly is detected in the
network, our algorithm will record all the network metrics of the identified attack
for further forensics and send all related information to the Counter Measure
Deployment module.
4.2.3 The Counter Measure Deployment
The Counter Measure Deployment module aims to neutralize identified attacks.
All information about detected attacks (e.g., source IP address, destination IP
address, source port and destination port) is collected from the Anomaly Detector
module. Then, this information will become an input for the Counter Measure
Deployment module. This module will insert new flow-entries into the flow table
or modify current flow-entries of the OpenFlow switch to drop all the malicious
traffic from attacking source IP addresses. A new flow rule can be sent from
the controller to the switches with an attack IP address in a matching field and
an ”of.OFPP DROP” action in an action field to drop all attack packets. The
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attacking packet can be redirected to a honey pot with a specific destination IP
address in the same way. A warning message will also be sent to the network
administrators for further actions. The complete process for countermeasure
deployment is summarized in Algorithm. 1.
Algorithm 1 The Counter Measure Deployment
1: for all Anomaly Packets do
2: msg = of.ofp packet out() . Create packet out message
3: msg.buffer id = event.ofp.buffer id
4: msg.in port = packet in.in port
5: msg.match = of.ofp match.from packet(packet)
6: action = of.ofp action output(port = of.OFPP DROP) . Add an action
to drop the packet
7: msg.actions.append(action)
8: self.connection.send(msg) . Send message to switches
9: end for
4.3 Experimental Methodology
4.3.1 DL Experimental Setup
In this chapter, we implement a fully-connected DNN model which is presented
in Chapter 3 and is the simplest form of DL algorithms. The DNN will be
trained with flow features, and it then classifies network traffic as legitimate traffic
or anomaly traffic. The anomaly traffic includes all types of network attacks
appearing in the training set. The number of hidden layers and the dimension of
each hidden layer can be varied to find the best structure for intrusion detection.
In our experiment, six input features will be used, so we define an input
layer with six neurons. As introduced in Chapter 3, the KDDTrain++ and KD-
DTest++ of the NSL-KDD dataset are used for training and testing the DNN
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respectively. We use Keras [93] to implement the DNN model. Details of all
initiated parameters of the DNN model can be seen in Table 4.2.
Variable Parameters
Input Layer 6
Hidden Layer 5,4,3
Output Layer 2
Activation Function Tanh
Loss Function Mean Squared Error
Batch Size 10
Epoch 1000
Table 4.2: The DNN Model Structure
In general, the DNN is constructed with an input layer, three hidden layers
and an output layer as described in Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: The DNN Structure
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Under the SDN context, we just focus on the basic features and traffic-based
features. For traditional networks, an anomaly-based NIDS is trained with a huge
amount of features including packet content-based features. This consumes a lot
of computer resources and time. Many researchers have developed feature selec-
tion algorithms to reduce the feature dimension and gain higher detection ACC.
However, the packet content is not directly accessible in the current OpenFlow
protocol, and so we do not employ any content-based features of this dataset.
In our experiment, we created three distinct sub-datasets that contain traffic
samples with six features extracted from the NSL-KDD dataset:
• Basic Feature Set: contains basic features of individual TCP connections
• Traffic Feature Set: contains features of network traffic
• Mixed Feature Set: contains both basic features and traffic-based features
The main purpose of these subsets is to evaluate the role of each type of
features to the detection performance. Details of each feature set can be found
in Table 4.3.
Feature Set Description
Basic Feature
Set
duration, protocol type, src bytes, dst bytes, land,
wrong fragment
Traffic Feature
Set
count, srv count, same srv rate, dst host count,
dst host same srv rate, dst host same src port rate
Mixed Feature
Set
duration, protocol type, src bytes, dst bytes, srv count,
dst host same src port rate
Table 4.3: Feature Set Description
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4.3.2 Network Performance Evaluation Setup
Cbench [94] is a standard tool used for evaluating SDN OpenFlow controllers.
In this chapter, Cbench is used to evaluate the overheads of the DeepIDS on
the SDN controller. We measured the performance of the controller in terms of
throughput and latency. Cbench tests can run in either throughput or latency
mode.
• In throughput mode, Cbench sends a stream of PACKET IN messages to
the controller for a specified period of time and then records the number
of responses (PACKET OUT messages) for the request that it has sent to
the controller. Throughput data reflects the average number of flows the
controller could treat per second in each switch.
• In latency mode, Cbench sends a PACKET IN message to the controller
and waits for the response (PACKET OUT message) before sending another
packet. The latency results represent the average number of milliseconds
that a flow consumes to be installed in each switch.
Figure 4.4 shows the flow diagram of network performance evaluation process.
At the beginning of the evaluation process, Cbench will be connected to the SDN
controller. Cbench emulates a network topology by itself, then sends PACKET IN
messages to the SDN controller and waits for PACKET OUT messages from the
SDN controller.
We tested the controller’s throughput and latency with a different number
of virtual OpenFlow switches emulated by Cbench. We evaluate the network
performance in six scenarios. Details about network parameters of each scenario
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Cbench
The SDN Controller
DeepIDS
PACKET IN PACKET OUT
Figure 4.4: The Network Evaluation Process
are described in Table 4.4. In all the testing scenarios, each switch is connected
with a thousand host in a star topology. Then all the switches are connected to
the SDN controller.
Number of Switches Number of Hosts in Each Switch
8 1000
16 1000
32 1000
64 1000
128 1000
256 1000
Table 4.4: Network Parameters
Each Cbench run consists of 10 test loops with a duration of 10 seconds. We
ran the controller with a typical layer 2 learning switch application. The obtained
results are the average values of the 10 tests. We evaluate the performance of the
controller in the following scenarios.
• The SDN controller runs stand-alone. This scenario serves as a baseline for
our evaluation.
• The SDN controller runs with DeepIDS or other ML algorithms being en-
abled.
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4.4 Detection Performance Evaluation
4.4.1 Effect of The Learning Rate
The DNN architecture is a very flexible architecture that consists of several layers
with a different number of neurons. Different network architectures and hyper-
parameter setting will yield different results. Tuning the DNN architecture and
hyper-parameters is a challenging task. The learning rate is one of the most
important hyper-parameters that we have to tune in each training process.
In this section, we firstly analyze the effect of different learning rates on detec-
tion performance. Thus, we tried to optimize the model by varying the value of
the learning rate in a range of {0.1, 0.01, 0.001, 0.0001}. When training the DNN
model, we tried to minimize the loss and maximize the ACC (see Equation 2.1).
Learning Rate
Train Set Test Set
Loss ACC (%) Loss ACC (%)
0.1 11.49 88.04 31.26 72.05
0.01 8.41 90.9 20.15 73.03
0.001 8.26 91.62 15.51 80.7
0.0001 7.45 91.7 20.3 74.67
Table 4.5: Loss and Accuracy Evaluation for Different Learning Rates
By comparing the loss and ACC of the training phase (see Table 4.5), we can
see that along with the decrease of the learning rate, the loss will decrease, and
the ACC will increase. However, in the testing phase, when we lower the learning
rate to 0.0001, the results are not as good as the learning rate of 0.001. This
is because if the learning rate is too small, the NIDS model will be trained too
accurately and the overfitting problem starts happening. That is the reason for
the best results in the training phase of the learning rate of 0.0001. Because of
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this too accurate training phase, the model cannot generalize the characteristic
of the training samples well. So while the model can easily catch the intrusion
instances in the training set, it cannot capture the new intrusion instances in the
testing set. As a result, DNN performance decreases in the testing phase. In
practice, the ACC of the testing phase is one of the most important evaluation
criteria. The higher testing ACC is, the better the DNN model is. This is to make
sure that the trained model can work well with new data and unseen attacks.
Secondly, we evaluate the P, R, and F1 (see Equations 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4) of the
model for more details. The performance of the DNN algorithm was evaluated
using the test data provided. The performance of the model with each learning
rate is shown in Table 4.6. As we can see, the learning rate of 0.001 gives us the
best results among the four learning rates in all evaluation metrics. All evaluation
metrics are in a growing trend when we decrease the learning rate from 0.1 to
0.001, but the metrics suddenly decrease at a learning rate of 0.0001. From
evaluating the evaluation metrics, the loss, and the ACC, we can see that the
performance of the DNN model decreases when the learning rate is decreased to
0.0001.
Learning Rate P (%) R (%) F1 (%)
0.1 79 72 72
0.01 82 73 72
0.001 85 81 81
0.0001 83 75 74
Table 4.6: Accuracy Metrics for Different Learning Rates
From the above evaluations, we can see that the learning rate has a substantial
impact on DNN performance. It must be analyzed carefully at the beginning of
the training process. In this chapter, the learning rate of 0.001 will be taken as
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the best parameter for other evaluations.
4.4.2 Effect of The Feature Set
We first analyze the impact of different feature sets on the ACC metric. The
performance of the model for each feature set is shown in Table 4.7. As we can
see, the Mixed Feature Set gives us the highest ACC with 80.7%. The ACC of
the Traffic Feature Set is quite low compared to others. The Basic Feature Set’s
ACC is just slightly smaller than that of the Mixed Feature Set.
Feature Set ACC (%)
Basic Feature Set 80
Traffic Feature Set 71
Mixed Feature Set 80.7
Table 4.7: Accuracy Evaluation for Different Feature Set
Table 4.8 gives you a more detailed view about the performance of DNN on
each feature set. As seen in Table 4.8, the R and P values of the Mixed Feature
Set are higher than the other sets. The evaluation result shows that with just a
small set of basic network features, we still can achieve high detection ACC. The
DNN shows its power in learning network characteristics from raw features. The
combination of basic and traffic features helps improve the DNN performance.
However, the traffic feature above does not give much information about the
network and attack characteristic, so the detection ACC is low.
In the following, ROC curves and their AUC are presented in Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.5 shows that the Mixed Feature Set gives the best result with the highest
AUC. The Basic and Traffic Feature Sets have quite high FPRs. As we can see, the
combination of basic features and traffic features helps reduce the FPR that is an
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Feature Set P (%) R (%) F1 (%)
Basic Feature Set 84 80 80
Traffic Feature Set 77 73 72
Mixed Feature Set 85 81 81
Table 4.8: Performance Metric Evaluation of Three Feature Sets
essential factor of NIDS. The high FPR means that there will be many legitimate
traffic classified as attacks. Therefore, our network will be more vulnerable. For
the Traffic Feature set, we can conclude that the difference between legitimate and
anomaly traffic is not significant, so the DNN cannot learn their characteristics
well. This leads to a very high FPR.
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Figure 4.5: ROC curve comparison for different feature sets. The Mixed Feature
Set achieves the best result with highest AUC and lowest FPR
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In the next experiment, we evaluate the sensitivity of each feature set with
some existing algorithms: Naive Bayes (NB), Decision Tree (DT) and SVM. The
NB and DT are quite simple and cost-effective. The SVM was proposed by Phan
et al. [18] for DDoS detection in SDNs. They used their own dataset, and so we
have to regenerate the results on the considered NSL-KDD dataset. The ROCs
of each test case are shown in Figure 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8. Each feature set has a
different effect on the performance of each algorithm.
For the Basic Feature set, all the algorithms perform quite well and are com-
parable to each other. The SVM yields a slightly better result than the others.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, The SVM is a popular intrusion detection approach
and has shown good results in detecting intrusion. Thus, the results in Figure 4.6
are expected. However, the SVM also has some drawbacks that will be discussed
in the next sections.
For the Traffic Feature set, following the results of previous evaluations, the
AUC results are quite low for all the algorithms except the NB. This phenomenon
is quite common in the field of ML/DL. One algorithm can work well with one
dataset but it can be bad for another dataset. Therefore, we had to experiment
with different algorithms to find the most suitable one for our problem.
In the case of the Mixed Feature set, the DNN and SVM have the same AUC
result and are the best amongst all the algorithms. In this case, we can see
that the overall FPR is quite low compared to those of other feature sets. This
confirms our conclusion about the contribution of basic and traffic features in
improving detection ACC.
All in all, NB achieves a quite high AUC in the case of the Traffic Features
Set. Despite the high AUC of the NB, its FPR is quite high and not feasible for
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Figure 4.6: ROC Curve Comparison of Different Algorithms for Basic Feature
Set
the NIDS. In general, the DNN works quite well with all of the feature set, with
quite low FPR and high AUC. SVM also achieves a quite high AUC, but it also
has some drawbacks like high FPR and low computational efficiency. We will
discuss the effectiveness of these algorithms in due course. The Mixed Feature
Set gives us the best combination of AUC and the FPR.
From the above evaluation, we can see the potential of DNN for intrusion
detection. The Mixed Feature Set will be chosen for further evaluation. We also
evaluated the P, R, and F1 of the model for more understanding. The performance
of the model is described in Table 4.9. As we can see, our model performs well
in the training phase with high ACC. However, the ACC decreases in the testing
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Figure 4.7: ROC Curve Comparison of Different Algorithms for Traffic Feature
Set
phase. This is because several attacks in the testing set are new and complex.
These attacks cannot be fully generalized by our existing DNN model using just
six basic network features. The R result of the testing phase shows that our DNN
model can detect almost all the attack mentioned in the KDDTest++ set, and
our results are significantly promising with a high P of 85%.
Dataset P (%) R (%) F1 (%)
Training Set 96 96 96
Testing Set 85 81 81
Table 4.9: Performance Metric Evaluation of the Mixed Feature Set
Table 4.10 gives us an overview of the ACC comparison amongst popular in-
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Figure 4.8: ROC Curve Comparison of Different Algorithms for Mixed Feature
Set
trusion detection algorithms. The proposed DNN gives the best results amongst
all the algorithm. This is because of the limitation of traditional ML meth-
ods. Without a large set of carefully hand-crafted input features, traditional ML
methods perform very poorly compared to the DL method.
In addition, we compared our results with the result in [86] from different ma-
chine learning algorithms. In [86], the authors train and test different algorithms
with a full training and testing set of forty-one features. From these experiments,
the authors can evaluate the performance of these algorithms in their dataset.
From Table 4.11, the DNN approach gives quite good ACC compared with other
algorithms. The most accurate machine learning algorithm is the NB tree with
86
4.4 Detection Performance Evaluation
Algorithm Accuracy (%)
NB 45
DT 74
SVM 70.9
DNN 80.7
Table 4.10: Accuracy Comparison for Different Algorithms Using the Mixed
Feature Set
82.02%. This is the ACC obtained from the full feature training set, and so the
NB tree algorithm can generalize the characteristics of the normal and anomaly
traffic very well.
Algorithm Accuracy (%)
J48 81.05
Naive Bayes (NB) 76.56
NB Tree 82.02
Random Forest 80.67
Random Tree 81.59
Multi-layer Perceptron 77.41
Support Vector Machine (SVM) 69.52
DNN 80.7
Table 4.11: Accuracy comparison of different algorithms. The DNN uses the
Mixed Feature Set with 6 features. The others use 41 features
In our experiments, it must be noted that only the six basic features in the
Mixed Feature Set are used for training and testing. This sub-feature set is quite
small compared to the full feature set, so it cannot provide enough information for
our DNN algorithm to generalize the characteristics of some sophisticated or new
attacks. However, it can be seen that the DNN performs reasonably compared
with other algorithms.
In summary, we have demonstrated that our proposed DNN approach can
generalize and abstract the characteristics of the normal and anomaly traffic
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with a small number of features and gives us a promising ACC. The result of DL
algorithm facilitates the development of flow-based NIDS under the SDN context.
All the basic network feature, that can be collected easily in the SDN architecture,
can be used directly by the DL algorithm without any feature engineering process.
4.4.3 Efficiency Evaluation
We also evaluate the efficiency of our model compared to other algorithms by
comparing the training time and the testing time of these algorithms. Table 4.12
provides relevant parameters for these algorithms. The NB and DT algorithms
have really low training and testing times in ms compared to the SVM and our
DNN. However, they also yield low detection ACC. The SVM is one of the most
popular algorithms in the field of intrusion detection, but it is not fast enough
for real-time detection, especially under SDN architectures. The total processing
time takes around 2.5 hours. Our DNN works much faster than the SVM and
also gives a better detection ACC, and so it is feasible for real-time detection in
SDNs.
Algorithm Training Time Testing Time
NB 19.8 ms 4 ms
SVM 2 h 30 min
DT 256.9 ms 2.74 ms
DNN 500 s 811.6 ms
Table 4.12: Running Time Evaluation
As mentioned in [63], the SOM algorithm was used for flow-based intrusion
detection in the SDN context. The SOM algorithm was trained and tested by a 6-
tuple feature (Average of Packets per flow, Average of Bytes per flow, Average of
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Duration per flow, Percentage of Pair-flows, Growth of Single-flows, and Growth
of Different Ports) dataset that consists of 8608 samples and 62888 samples in
the training set and testing set respectively. The system takes about 7.16 hours
for training and 352 ms for testing. Despite the difference of the experimented
systems, our DeepIDS computation cost is really low (with the same number of
features and a larger number of samples) when compared to [63].
4.5 Network Performance Evaluation
In this section, we provide detailed network performance analysis of our DeepIDS
in a POX [35] controller. We also compare the network performance of the
DeepIDS with the SVM algorithm. We also evaluate resource utilization and
briefly discuss our observations in this section.
The DeepIDS is implemented in the POX controller as an application writ-
ten in Python language. Currently, POX supports OpenFlow 1.0 protocol and
includes special support for the Open vSwitch/Nicira extensions. In order to test
the performance of DeepIDS in the POX controller, we used a Virtual Machine
having Intel Core i5-4460 3.2 GHz processor with three cores available and 8 GB
of RAM memory. The evaluation setup for this experiment has been described
in Section 4.3.2.
4.5.1 Throughput Evaluation
For throughput mode tests, we evaluate how many packets a controller can process
in a second. This metric indicates the performance of the controller under heavy
traffic conditions. Figure 4.9 depicts the average response rate of the network in
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three testing scenarios.
Figure 4.9: Throughput Evaluation (log scale on x-axis)
As we can see, the performance of the POX controller itself is quite poor with
a maximum throughput around 4900 responses/s. This is one of the limitations
of the POX controller compared to other SDN controllers. However, the run-
ning stand-alone POX controller still performs best and is taken as a baseline for
performance evaluation in our experiment. Of overall assessment, the bigger the
size of the network then the higher the performance overhead. The throughput
slightly decreases with the increasing network size according to the results in Fig-
ure 4.9. The network performance drops when the number of forwarding devices
increases up to 64, showing that the controller throughput degrades by roughly
3% from 32 to 64 switches. The baseline results for the smallest network scale and
the largest network scale are 4852 responses/s and 4607 responses/s respectively.
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The DeepIDS and SVM overheads are about 2% and 3.12% respectively in the
case of 8 switches.
We can see that in the case of high PACKET IN message rate with 256
switches, DeepIDS’s throughput decreases by 2.7% with 4465 responses/s. The
SVM algorithm’s throughput decreases by about 3.2% in the same situation. The
reason for this behaviour is that the NIDS sends OFP FLOW STATS REQUEST
messages and processes OFP FLOW STATS REPLY messages during processing
PACKET IN messages. When the network size increases, the NIDS has to process
a large amount of OFP FLOW STATS REPLY messages resulting in the over-
head. Figure 4.9 shows that the SVM algorithm has affected the controller and
resulted in the low network throughput in all test cases. As we can see, DeepIDS
performs better than the SVM algorithm in terms of throughput. DeepIDS’s
throughput degradation (which is around 4% on average) is quite low and has
almost no effect on the POX controller’s performance.
4.5.2 Latency Evaluation
For latency mode tests, the controller is evaluated for the length of time it takes to
process a single packet. This metric reflects the performance of the controller in
light traffic conditions. The testing scenarios are the same as the throughput test.
As depicted in Figure 4.10, the latency increases with the increasing network size.
This is expected behavior: increasing the number of devices will increase the load
at the controllers, causing a latency increase. In general, we can see in Figure 4.10
that the SVM always has higher latency than the DeepIDS. The NIDS takes time
to process the PACKET IN message, the OFP FLOW STATS REPLY message
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and detect anomaly flows, and so the performance overhead is unavoidable. The
SVM algorithm takes a longer time to process the information, and thus it results
in a higher latency under high traffic rates. The DeepIDS and SVM overhead are
about 2.6% and 5.8% respectively in the case of 256 switches. The DeepIDS’s
latency degradation is quite low and can be improved in the future.
Figure 4.10: Latency Evaluation (log scale on x-axis)
4.5.3 Resource Utilization
We also evaluate the resource utilization of DeepIDS. The POX controller itself re-
source utilization is a benchmark for our comparison. As we can see in Table 4.13,
DeepIDS does not use a lot of computer resources. In general, DL requires a sig-
nificant computational cost. DL models usually have high-dimensional inputs
and a large number of hidden layers. However, in our experiment, we minimize
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the input with just six basic network features and use three hidden layers. As
a result, our DNN model is quite simple, and so it uses computational resources
optimally.
Algorithm CPU Usage (%) Memory Usage (%)
POX 15 7.5
DNN 17 8.2
Table 4.13: Resource Utilization Evaluation
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we proposed the DeepIDS as an SDN-based NIDS architecture.
We have implemented a DL algorithm for detecting network intrusion and evalu-
ated our DeepIDS. Our results show that our approach has significant potential
and advantages for further development. By comparing the results with those of
other classifiers, we have demonstrated the potential of using DL for the flow-
based anomaly detection system. In the context of the SDN environment, the
DL-based IDS approach is promising. Regarding the above-mentioned evalua-
tions, we can see that our method does not affect network performance signifi-
cantly. Therefore, our approach is quite promising and can be improved in many
ways. With the flexibility of the SDN structure, we can extract features focused
on one specific type of attack, like DDoS, to increase the ACC of the NIDS. As
shown above, our DeepIDS gives the slightly lower ACC than other approaches
that use a full 41 feature NSL-KDD dataset. In the future, we will optimize our
model to improve the detection rate and decrease the false alarm rate.
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Chapter5
Deep Recurrent Neural Networks
for SDN-based Intrusion
Detection Systems
We introduce a Gated Recurrent Unit Recurrent Neural Network (GRU-
RNN) for time series network traffic classification. As Internet traffic traces
are a kind of time series data, we believe that GRU-RNNs are suitable for
this task. The aim of this chapter is to improve the intrusion detection
ACC on the Internet traffic. We demonstrate through our experiment and
analysis that the GRU-RNN can improve the ACC significantly without
degrading the network performance.
In This Chapter:
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5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 Motivation
The DNN in the previous chapter shows the potential of DL under the context
of SDN. This approach is relatively lightweight, but the detection ACC is quite
low compared to other state-of-the-art results and not applicable for real NIDS.
Therefore, there is a need to improve the detection rate. Recently, Recurrent
Neural Networks (RNNs) have shown great success in language modelling, text
generating and speech recognition [20] [22]. Following the trajectory of current
research, we believe that deep RNNs can potentially offer better solutions for
implementation of IDS under the context of SDN.
Network traffic often shows temporal correlations. As a result, these sequen-
tial traffic traces lead to the generation of time series data. For the DNN, this
temporal information can be lost during the training process. The RNN ad-
dresses this issue. It is a powerful technique that can represent the relationship
between a current event and previous events. Some network anomalies are col-
lective anomalies, so they are difficult to detect by the DNN. We believe that the
RNN enhances the anomaly detection rate. In this chapter, a Gated Recurrent
Unit Recurrent Neural Network (GRU-RNN) is proposed to take advantage of
network time series data to detect anomaly traffic.
5.1.2 Contribution
In summary, the major contributions of this chapter are the following:
• We introduce a NIDS in the SDN environment using GRU-RNN.
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• Our GRU-RNN approach yields a detection rate of 89% in the NSL-KDD
dataset using a minimum number of features compared to other state-of-the-
art approaches. This gives our approach significant potential for real-time
detection. The GRU-DNN achieves an impressive detection rate of 99%
dealing with DDoS attacks in the CICIDS2017 dataset.
• We also evaluate the network performance of our proposed approach in the
SDN environment. The results show that our approach does not signifi-
cantly degrade the SDN controller’s performance.
5.1.3 Chapter Organization
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents an
introduction about RNNs and Gated Recurrent Units (GRU). In Section 5.3, we
give a system description and an analysis of detection performance. Section 5.4
presents the network performance analysis. Finally, Section 5.5 concludes the
chapter.
5.2 Recurrent Neural Networks
An RNN, which is an extension of a conventional NN mentioned in Chapter 3,
makes use of the sequential information. The idea is that the RNN can use
information from previous stages to understand information at the current stage.
This is also the way that the human brain works. The RNN is called a “recurrent”
because it performs the same task for every element of a sequence, with the
output being dependent on the previous computations. Figure 5.1 shows the
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RNN unfolded in time.
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Figure 5.1: The RNN Unfolded in Time
Mathematically, the hidden states and output of the RNN are computed as:
ht = σ(Wxt + Uht−1 + bh), t = 1, 2, . . . , T, (5.1)
yt = σ(Vht), (5.2)
where σ(·) is a non-linearity function, xt is an input vector at time t, ht is a
hidden state vector at time t, W is an input to hidden weight matrix, U is a
hidden to hidden weight matrix, V is a hidden to label weight matrix, and bh is
a bias vector.
The Backpropagation Through Time (BPTT) [95] algorithm is used for train-
ing the RNN. However, BPTT for the traditional RNN is usually difficult due to a
problem known as vanishing/exploding gradient [96]. Long Short Term Memory
(LSTM) [97] networks and GRUs [8] were proposed to solve this problem and are
among the most widely used models in DL algorithms.
GRUs are selected in our research because of their simplicity and faster train-
ing phase compared to LSTMs [98]. Figure 5.2 shows architecture detail of a
single GRU cell.
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Figure 5.2: Gated Recurrent Unit Structure [8]
Reffering Figure 5.2, the activation hjt of each j−th GRU unit at time t is
computed differently from Equation 5.1 as follows:
hjt = (1− zjt )hjt−1 + zjt h˜jt , t = 1, 2, . . . , T, (5.3)
where an update gate zjt defines how much of the previous memory to keep, h˜
j
t−1
is the previous hidden state and h˜jt is the candidate activation. The update gate
is computed by
zjt = σ(Wzxt + Uzht−1)
j, (5.4)
where σ(·) is a non-linearity function, Wz and Uz are learned weight matrices.
The candidate activation h˜jt is computed by
h˜jt = tanh(Whxt + Uh(ht−1  rt))j, (5.5)
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where a set of reset gates rt determines how to combine the new input with the
previous activation vector,  is an element-wise vector multiplication, and Wh
and Uh are learned weight matrices . The reset gate is computed by
rt = σ(Wrxt + Urht−1), (5.6)
where σ(·) is again a non-linearity function, and Wr and Ur are learned weight
matrices.
5.3 Detection Performance Evaluation
5.3.1 Experimental Methodology
In this chapter, the experimental methodology is the same as Chapter 4. The
Mixed Feature Set, that gave us the best ACC in Chapter 4, is used for training
and testing in this chapter. In addition, the CICIDS2017 dataset is also used
in this chapter for further evaluation. We extract a subset of six features out of
80 features of the CICIDS2017 dataset for our research. These features have an
SDN-related nature and can be extracted easily by SDN controllers. Details of
these features can be seen in Table 5.1.
According to our experiments, A GRU-RNN with three hidden layers gives
the best results in all experimental cases. Therefore, we implemented a GRU-
RNN with three hidden layers in this chapter. A DNN is also implemented with
the same structure as the proposed GRU-RNN for evaluation purposes. We used
Keras [93] to implement our GRU-RNN, DNN, and VanilaRNN models. The
Scikit-learn library [99] is used to implement the SVM algorithm and measure all
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Feature Name Description
Source Port Source port of the flow
Destination Port Destination port of the flow
Protocol Protocol type of the flow
Flow Duration Duration of the flow in mi-
croseconds
Flow Bytes/s Number of flow bytes per
second
Flow Packet/s Number of flow packets per
second
Table 5.1: The CICIDS2017’s Feature Description
the evaluation metrics. The details of all models can be seen in Table 5.2.
Algorithm Input
Layer
Hidden
Layer
Output
Layer
Activation
Function
Learning
Rate
GRU-RNN 6 6,4,3 2 tanh, tanh,
tanh, sig-
moid
0.001
DNN 6 6,4,3 2 tanh, tanh,
tanh, sig-
moid
0.001
VanilaRNN 6 4 1 tanh, sig-
moid
0.001
Table 5.2: Neural Network Model Structures
For the training phase, the batch size and epoch number are 100 and 10000
respectively. We use a Nadam optimizer [100] and Mean Squared Error (MSE)
function for the GRU-RNN model. In addition, we added L1-regularization to
our model to prevent overfitting during the training phase.
In general, the RNN architecture is the same as the DNN architecture (as in
Figure 5.3). The main difference is that each neuron is now a GRU cell.
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Figure 5.3: The RNN Structure
5.3.2 Experimental Result Analysis
To start with, we analyze training and testing processes of the GRU-RNN. As
shown in Figure 5.4, it takes us a considerable amount of time to train the GRU-
RNN. At the beginning, we can see that the GRU-RNN achieves a very high ACC
of 95% in training, but the model performance is very poor with testing data.
However, after around 6000 epochs, the GRU-RNN performance starts improving
significantly. We can see that the ACC in training starts dropping gradually, but
the ACC in testing starts increasing significantly. This is what we expect when
training a DNN in general. The GRU-RNN is a quite complex algorithm, so it
takes quite a long time to find its optimal point that gives the highest ACC. In
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the previous chapter, the DNN is quite lightweight and simple, so it just takes
around 1000 epochs to achieve its best result. It is also interesting to see that if
we keep training the GRU-RNN for a longer time, the model performance drops
again. This is the time when overfitting happens.
Figure 5.4: Traing and Testing Phase Evaluation
The best model from our training process will be taken for further evaluation.
The results in Table 5.3 show that our approach outperforms other methods in
terms of detection ACC. The DNN, coming in second place, shows the potential
of the DL approach in anomaly detection. The VanilaRNN gives the worst result
compared with its counterpart GRU-RNN. This is the expected result. As men-
tioned in the previous section, the VanilaRNN suffers from the vanishing gradient
problem that makes the detection ACC becomes worst after a long training time.
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The result of the GRU-RNN shows that it solves the vanishing gradient problem
very well and then improves the ACC significantly.
Algorithm ACC (%)
VanilaRNN 44.39
SVM 65.67
DNN 80.7
GRU-RNN (Proposed Model) 89
Table 5.3: Accuracy Comparison with Other Algorithms
For further evaluation, we present the anomaly detection performance of the
GRU-RNN model in terms of ACC, P, R, and F1 (see Equations 2.1, 2.2, 2.3,
and 2.4) on the NSL-KDD dataset. The performance of each class is calculated
based on the TP and TN of each class. Details of the results given in Table 5.4
show that our GRU-RNN performs well for all the evaluation metrics. Both the
legitimate and anomaly traffic traces are detected really well by the GRU-RNN.
The detection rates of the legitimate and anomaly traffic traces are 89% and 90%
respectively. The anomaly detection ACC of 90% shows that the GRU-RNN is
good at detecting zero-day attacks.
Class Name P (%) R (%) F1 (%)
Legitimate 87 89 88
Anomaly 91 90 90
Table 5.4: Performance Metric Evaluation for the NSL-KDD Dataset
We also compare the performance of our proposed model with other popular
algorithms like VanilaRNN, Support Vector Machine (SVM) and DNN using the
same subset of six features. As we can see in Figure 5.5, the GRU-RNN outper-
forms other algorithms in all the evaluation metrics. The GRU-RNN yields good
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results for both legitimate and anomaly traffic traces, while other algorithms just
work well in only one class. The GRU-RNN outperforms other algorithms in de-
tecting anomaly traffic as we expected. Flooding DDoS attacks in the NSL-KDD
dataset are collective anomalies, so they can be characterized and detected by
the GRU-RNN. These attacks can be missed by the DNN and other algorithms.
Figure 5.5: Performance Metric Comparison
The ROC curve is introduced to evaluate our proposed approach. Figure. 5.6
shows that the proposed GRU-RNN achieves the highest AUC amongst all the
tested algorithms with a TPR of 90% and an FPR of 10%. As we can see,
the GRU-RNN has the lowest FPR which is an essential factor of the IDS. The
VanilaRNN gives the worst result as expected. The VanilaRNN suffers from the
gradient vanishing problem, so it cannot give us a promising result after a long
training time.
The P vs R curve shows the trade-off between P and R for different thresholds.
A high area under the curve represents both high R and high P. An ideal system
with a high area under the curve will return many results, with all results labelled
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Figure 5.6: ROC Curve Comparison for Different Algorithms
correctly. As seen in Figure. 5.7, the GRU-RNN gives us the best results amongst
all the algorithms. As the R threshold increases, the P decreases significantly for
all the algorithms, except for GRU-RNN where increases P increases to 89%.
This means the GRU-RNN can classify the network traffic with a high ACC.
Furthermore, we also compared the performance of our proposed model with
others in the literature. Our GRU-RNN is compared with other state-of-the-art
algorithms like SVM, DNN, and NB Tree algorithms. The NB Tree gave the best
result in [86]. The results in Table 5.5 show that our proposed model outperforms
all the previous methods. Our GRU-RNN performs better than the SVM and
105
5.3 Detection Performance Evaluation
Figure 5.7: P vs R Curves
NB Tree algorithms that use the whole set of 41 features for training and testing.
Even when we provide more network features, the other algorithms cannot detect
the collective anomalies as good as the GRU-RNN. The GRU-RNN results also
indicate a significant improvement in the ACC compared to the basic DNN in
our previous chapter.
For further investigation, we evaluate the GRU-DNN performance as regards
detecting DDoS attacks in the CICIDS2017 dataset. We compare the proposed
GRU-DNN with DNN and ID3 algorithms. Results of ID3 algorithm are the
best achieved from the CICIDS2017 dataset in [89]. Table 5.6 gives details of
our evaluation. As can be seen, the proposed GRU-DNN has better results in all
the evaluation metrics compared with the best result from [89]. The DNN yields
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Method ACC (%)
SVM [86] 69.52
DNN [101] 75.75
NB Tree [86] 82.02
GRU-RNN (Proposed Model) 89
Table 5.5: Accuracy comparison with previous studies. The GRU-RNN and
DNN use the Mixed Feature Set with 6 features. The SVM and NB Tree use the
NSL-KDD dataset with 41 features
slightly lower results than that of the ID3. The proposed GRU-DNN can work
well with diverse and complex traffic traces and detect almost all types of DDoS
attacks in the CICIDS2017 dataset.
Method P (%) R (%) F1 (%)
DNN 97 97 97
ID3 [89] 98 98 98
GRU-RNN (Proposed Model) 99 99 99
Table 5.6: Performance Metric Evaluation for the CICIDS2017 dataset
From the above results, the GRU-DNN shows its strong potential in dealing
with low-dimensional time series traffic. Therefore, it is a potential solution for
intrusion detection in the SDN paradigm.
5.4 Network Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the effect of our proposed GRU-RNN on the perfor-
mance of the POX controller in the SDN environment. The network evaluation
setup is also as in Chapter 4 (Section 4.3.2).
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5.4.1 Throughput Evaluation
Throughput evaluation indicates the performance of the controller under heavy
traffic conditions. Figure. 5.8 depicts the average response rate of the controller
under three testing scenarios.
Figure 5.8: Throughput Evaluation
As we can see, both the DNN and GRU-RNN cause overhead on the con-
troller. The DNN algorithm is simpler than the GRU-RNN, and so it gives
a slightly better network performance than that of the GRU-RNN. However,
the GRU-RNN outperforms the DNN in terms of the detection ACC. The ef-
fect of the GRU-RNN on the controller performance is predictable. The net-
work throughput decreases slightly when the network size increases from 32
switches to 64 switches. The network performance degrades by about 3.5%
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when the network size is under 32 switches. When we increase the size to
over 64 switches, the throughput drops by about 4%. The GRU-RNN mod-
ule has to send several OFP FLOW STATS REQUEST messages and process
OFP FLOW STATS REPLY messages while processing PACKET IN messages.
Thus, the overhead on the controller of the GRU-RNN module is unavoidable.
However, throughput degradation is quite low and can be improved in the future.
5.4.2 Latency Evaluation
Latency evaluation indicates the length of time that the controller takes to process
one single packet. Figure. 5.9 shows the average response time of the controller
under three testing scenarios. As we can see, the network latency increases along
with increasing the network size. When we increase the network size, the load on
the controller is increased as well and this causes the overhead. The GRU-RNN
still has the highest overhead amongst all. It takes time for the GRU-RNN to
process the OFP FLOW STATS REPLY messages, PACKET IN messages and
detect anomaly flows, so the overhead is unavoidable. The overall degradation is
about 7% in all cases. This overhead is not significant and can be improved in
the future.
All in all, the overhead caused by the GRU-RNN on the SDN controller is
quite low, and so our proposed approach has significant potential for real-time
intrusion detection in the SDN paradigm.
109
5.5 Conclusion
Figure 5.9: Latency Evaluation
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented an Anomaly-based NIDS in the SDN environments
using the GRU-RNN algorithm. We showed that our proposed approach out-
performs other state-of-the-art algorithms with an ACC of 89% and 99% for the
NSL-KDD and CICIDS2017 datasets. Although the GRU-RNN is more complex
and takes a longer time than the DNN in Chapter 3 for training and testing. The
detection ACC has been improved significantly compared to the work in Chapter
3. There is a trade-off between performance and security. However, the perfor-
mance still can be improved in the future. Our scheme uses a minimum number
of features compared to other state-of-the-art approaches so computational costs
can be reduced significantly. In addition, the network performance evaluation
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showed that our proposed approach does not significantly affect the controller
performance. This makes our model a strong candidate for real-time detection.
In the future, we will optimize our model and use other features to increase the
ACC and reduce the overhead on the controller. We will also try to extend our
research to unsupervised intrusion detection approaches.
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Deep Learning Approach
Combining Stacked Autoencoder
with One-class SVM for DDoS
Attack Detection in SDNs
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the lack of network datasets is one of the main
problems for anomaly detection in SDNs. Currently, most of the proposed
ML/DL intrusion detection approaches are in a supervised manner that re-
quires labelled and well-balanced datasets for training. However, this needs
a lot of time and human expertise to prepare these datasets. Besides, net-
work attacks keep evolving, especially DDoS attacks, so it is challenging to
get good labeled datasets. The goal of this chapter is to detect the DDoS
attacks in an unsupervised manner by using the flow table information. In
this chapter, we propose a hybrid approach using the Stack Autoencoder and
One-class Support Vector Machine (SAE-1SVM) for DDoS attack detection.
The SAE-1SVM shows that it can reduce the processing time significantly
while maintaining the high DDoS attack detection rate.
In This Chapter:
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6.1 Introduction
6.1.1 Motivation
Because of the SDN architecture, the SDN controller is a single point of failure and
a target for attackers. The SDN controller is vulnerable to DoS and DDoS attacks.
These attacks can take down the SDN controller and then the whole network.
Therefore, DDoS attacks directly threaten the network and service availability.
Detecting and mitigating DDoS attacks effectively become an important part of
the NIDS. Several works [66] [15] [77] [78] have been done to tackle this problem
in SDNs. Most of these works are for the supervised approach. This approach
requires balanced and labelled datasets for training. However, these datasets
are not always available for researchers, and they are especially rare under the
context of SDN.
Unlike supervised learning approaches, the unsupervised learning approach
does not need label information for the data and can address the imbalanced
classification problems. One-class Support Vector Machine (OC-SVM) for a long
time has been one of the most effective anomaly detection methods and is widely
adopted in both research and industrial applications. However, the biggest issues
for OC-SVM is the capability to operate with large and high-dimensional datasets
due to inefficient features and optimization complexity. Their training speed is
also heavily affected by the size of the dataset. As a result, conventional OC-
SVM may not be desirable in big data and high-dimensional anomaly detection
applications. Besides, Autoencoder recently emerges as an effective intrusion
detection approach in different fields [102] [103] [104]. In these researches, a
reconstruction error is used to detect anomalies. In this chapter, we propose
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an unsupervised hybrid approach combining Stack Autoencoder with OC-SVM
(SAE-1SVM) for DDoS attack detection in the SDN.
6.1.2 Contribution
Our main contributions are as follows:
• We introduce an unsupervised DDoS attack detection approach in the SDN
paradigm using the SAE-1SVM. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first attempt to use the SAE-1SVM for DDoS attack detection in the SDN
environment. In our work, the Stack Autoencoder learns the patterns of
legitimate traffic and also compresses input data into a lower dimension.
These lower-dimensional and higher-level data is now more suitable for the
OC-SVM to process.
• Our SAE-1SVM approach yields a detection rate of 99.35% using a mini-
mum number of features compared to other state-of-the-art approaches.
• We also evaluate the computational overhead of the proposed approach.
The results show that our approach has significant potential for real-time
intrusion detection.
6.1.3 Chapter Organization
This chapter is organized as follow. In section 6.2, we introduce DDoS attacks
and its taxonomy. Section 6.3 describes our proposed hybrid approach for DDoS
attack detection. Section 6.4 shows the performance evaluation of our approach.
Finally, conclusions and future work are discussed in section 6.5.
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6.2 Denial-of-Service Attacks
DoS and DDoS attacks are serious threats in current networks. Even though
DDoS attacks have been recognized in networks, since the origins of the Internet
the number of DDoS attacks in today’s networks still increase. The victim of
DDoS attacks can be any business or critical infrastructure. For example, on
23rd October 2015, TalkTalk in England had been hit by a DDoS attack that
allowed the attacker access to banking accounts and personal information of over
four million UK customers. A DDoS attack is an attempt to exhaust a victim’s
bandwidth or disrupt legitimate users’ access to services. This attack is relatively
easy to perform, hard to defend against, and the attacker is rarely traced back
because of the distributed nature of DDoS attacks. The attacker launches a DDoS
attack using a botnet-group of zombies-to generate a vast amount of traffic against
a victim’s web server. Zombies or computers that are part of a botnet are usually
recruited through the use of worms, Trojan horses or back doors. Figure 6.1
describes a topology of DDoS attacks.
The complexity of the attack increases due to the zombies modifying the
packets, commonly spoofing the source. As a consequence, it becomes even more
difficult to trace the origin of the attack. Some well-known bandwidth-consuming
DDoS attacks are UDP flood, TCP flood and SYN flood attack. These high rate
DDoS attacks significantly deviate from the legitimate traffic so we can detect
them comparatively easier. However, unlike bandwidth-consuming DDoS attacks,
the Slowloris attack uses a low amount of bandwidth and mimics the legitimate
traffic, so it is more difficult to detect. DDoS flooding attacks can be classified
into two categories based on the protocol level that is targeted:
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Figure 6.1: DDoS Attack Topology
• Network/transport-level DDoS flooding attacks: these attacks have been
mostly launched using TCP, UDP, ICMP and DNS protocol packets. There
are four types of attacks in this category: flooding attacks, protocol ex-
ploitation flooding attacks, reflection-based flooding attacks, amplification-
based flooding attacks
• Application-level DDoS flooding attacks: these attacks focus on disrupting
legitimate user’s services by exhausting the server resources (e.g., Sockets,
CPU, memory, disk/database bandwidth, and I/O bandwidth). Application-
level DDoS attacks generally consume less bandwidth and are stealthier in
nature compared to benign traffic. However, application-level DDoS flood-
ing attacks usually have the same impact on the services since they target
specific characteristics of applications such as HTTP, DNS, or Session Ini-
tiation Protocol (SIP). There are two types of attacks in this category:
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reflection/amplification based flooding attacks and HTTP flooding attacks.
Within the operation of SDN, there are two options for the handling of new
flow when no flow match exists in the flow table. Either the complete packet or a
portion of the packet header is transmitted to the controller to resolve the query.
In this case, it would be easy for attackers to execute a DoS attack on the node
by setting up many new and unknown flows. As the memory element of the node
can be a bottleneck due to the high cost, an attacker could potentially overload
the switch memory. Therefore attackers might simply flood the flow tables of
the switch using conventional DDoS methods. The controller and data plane
communication channel are also vulnerable to various DDoS attacks. Zombie
hosts generate unknown packets with bogus header fields which switches then
forward to the controller for advice. Because of large amounts of traffic, legitimate
packets might be dropped by the controller, and so there is a possibility to slow the
processing power significantly enough to cause an overload in control operations.
Defending against DDoS attacks is a challenging issue, and in order to do
so, we have to first detect them. There are several methods for detecting DDoS
attacks like statistics-based method [105], and clustering method [106]. DDoS
attacks can be mitigated by some defence mechanisms like firewall, load balancing.
However, these defence mechanisms have their own limitations. Despite all the
effort to tackle these attacks, DDoS attack strategies are evolving, so it is tough
to detect and mitigate all of these attacks. There are several companies providing
commercial DDoS protection services (e.g., Radware, CloudFlare).
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6.3 SAE-1SVM for DDoS Attack Detection
An autoencoder (AE) consists of one input layer, one or more hidden layers and
one output layer. The input and output layers always have the same sizes. A
general structure of an AE is shown in Figure 6.2.
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Figure 6.2: A General Structure of an AE
The AE has two phases which are encoding and decoding. For encoding pro-
cess, input data x is compressed into a low-dimensional representation h and then
the decoder reconstructs the input based on the low-dimensional representation.
h = f(Wx + b), (6.1)
y = f(W′h + b′), (6.2)
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where f(·) is a non-linearity activation function, W and W′ are hidden weight
matrices, b and b′ are biases and y is output vector.
The main goal of training the AE is to minimize the difference between the
input x and output y. Therefore, a MSE loss function is used as follows:
L(x,y) = ‖x− y‖22 . (6.3)
In order to learn feature representations of input data, AEs are stacked suc-
cessively to form a deep AE (SAE). The learned feature representations will be
used as inputs for other classifiers. In this work, the OC-SVM is used as the
classifier for anomaly detection.
The OC-SVM [107] is an unsupervised approach for classification. The OC-
SVM tries to learn a hyperplane that best separates all the data points from the
origin:
f(x) = wTφ(x)− ρ, (6.4)
where φ(·) is a feature projection function that maps an input vector x into a
higher dimensional feature space, w is a decision hyperplane normal vector which
is perpendicular to the hyperplane, and ρ is an intercept term. We can obtain w
and ρ by solving an objective function:
min
ω,ξ,ρ
1
2
‖w‖2 + 1
νn
n∑
i=1
ξi − ρ, (6.5)
subject to: wTφ(xi) ≥ ρ− ξi, ξi > 0,
119
6.3 SAE-1SVM for DDoS Attack Detection
where the meta-parameter ν ∈ (0, 1] determines the upper bound on the fraction
of outliers and the lower bound on the number of training samples used as support
vectors, and ξi are non-zero slack variables for penalizing the outliers.
By using Lagrangian techniques and a kernel function for the dot-product
calculations, the decision function becomes:
f(x) =
n∑
i
αik(xi,x)− ρ, (6.6)
where αi is a Lagrange multiplier, and k(xi,x) = φ(xi)
Tφ(x) is a kernel function.
A Radial Basic Function (RBF) kernel is employed in our experiment:
k(xi,x) = e
−γ‖xi−x‖2 , γ > 0. (6.7)
In this chapter, we propose a hybrid approach combining SAE with OC-SVM
for DDoS attack detection. Figure 6.3 gives a general structure of the proposed
SAE-1SVM. The SAE-1SVM is trained with legitimate traffic traces. At first, the
legitimate traffic traces are trained with the SAE to extract the low-dimensional
representation, and then the low-dimensional representation is trained with OC-
SVM for DDoS attack classification. Because the SAE-1SVM is trained with the
legitimate traffic only, the anomaly traffic will be considered as outliers and then
detected.
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Figure 6.3: SAE-1SVM System Detail
6.4 Detection Performance Evaluation
6.4.1 Experimental Setup
In our experiment, the SAE architecture is implemented with all hyper-parameters
given in Table 6.1. For the OC-SVM model, the parameters ν and γ are chosen
from the range {10−10, 10−9,...,100}. After the optimizing process, the parameters
ν = 10−2 and γ = 10−2 are choosen for the experiment.
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Variable Parameters
Activation Function Tanh
Loss Function Mean Squared Error
Learning Rate 0.001
Batch Size 10
Epoch 1000
Table 6.1: The SAE Architecture
In this chapter, we just focus on DDoS attack detection, so we only use the
CICIDS2017 dataset for training and testing. This dataset contains the most
recent types of DDoS attacks. In Table 6.2, we describe thirteen features used in
this experiment.
Feature Name Description
Source Port Source port of the flow
Destination Port Destination port of the flow
Protocol Protocol type of the flow
Flow Duration Duration of the flow in microseconds
Total Fwd Packets Total packets in the forward direction
Total Length of
Fwd Packets
Total size of packet in forward direction
Fwd Packet Length
Mean
Standard deviation size of packet in for-
ward direction
Flow Bytes/s Number of flow bytes per second
Flow Packet/s Number of flow packets per second
Flow IAT Mean Mean time between two packets sent in
the forward direction
Flow IAT Std Standard deviation time between two
packets sent in the forward direction
Fwd Packets/s Number of forward packets per second
Subflow Fwd Bytes The average number of packets in a sub
flow in the forward direction
Table 6.2: The CICIDS2017’s Feature Description
Again, these features are selected under the context of SDN architectures.
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As a result, the input and output layers of our SAE contain thirteen neurons
respectively. Details about the number of neurons of each network architecture
used in this experiment are shown in Table 6.3.
Architecture Input Layer Hidden Layer Output Layer
AE 13 2 13
SAE 1 13 6,2,6 13
SAE 2 13 10,8,6,4,2,4,6,8,10 13
Table 6.3: Network Architecture Details
6.4.2 DDoS Attack Detection with a Hard Threshold
The AE is commonly used to detect anomaly with the idea that behaviors of
attacks are different from those of legitimate traffic. Therefore, the AE will
be trained only with the legitimate traffic and then tries to reconstruct them
with the highest ACC. The anomaly traffic is not used for training, so the AE
cannot reconstruct them correctly. We can detect anomaly traffic based on this
difference. In this section, we analyze the effect of network architecture on the
reconstruction performance.
We compare the reconstruction ACC of the AE, SAE 1, and SAE 2 in Ta-
ble 6.4. As we can see, the SAE 2 yields the best reconstruction ACC at 98.6%.
The AE gives a quite low reconstruction ACC at 85%. With just one hidden
layer, we cannot learn good feature representations, so the reconstructed input is
just a lossy version of the original inputs. It shows that a deeper SAE can learn
feature representations better and then reconstructs the inputs with a higher
ACC. Therefore, the SAE 2 will be chosen for further experiment.
As in [102], [103], and [104], we also employ the reconstruction error to detect
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Architecture Reconstruction ACC (%)
AE 85
SAE 1 96
SAE 2 98.6
Table 6.4: Reconstruction ACC Comparison
anomalies. The SAE 2 is trained to minimize the reconstruction error, so the
error rate should be quite small with the legitimate input traffic. If any anomaly
traffic is fed into the SAE 2, the SAE 2 could not recognize it and reconstruct it
correctly. In this case, the reconstruction error is higher than normal, and so we
can detect the network attack.
Figure 6.4 shows the difference in the reconstruction error rate between the
legitimate and anomaly traffic. As seen in Figure 6.4, some anomaly error rates
dramatically deviate from the standard legitimate error rate. It is quite easy
for us to detect these kinds of attacks with a hard threshold. However, we also
can see that some anomaly traffic has quite the same reconstruction error as
the legitimate ones. These attacks cannot be detected with a hard threshold.
The legitimate and anomaly reconstruction error rates are not linearly separated,
so we cannot define any good hard threshold to detect anomaly traffic. If we
set a high hard threshold, the FPR will increase significantly, and our network
will become vulnerable to attacks. If we set a low hard threshold, the FAR
will increase and so the NIDS can block the legitimate traffic. In Table 6.5, we
compare the performance of different threshold values in terms of ACC, P, R,
and F1 (see Equations 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4). As we can see, with a higher
threshold, we get a higher detection ACC. However, the other evaluation metrics
drop dramatically with high threshold values. The reason for this trend is that
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more legitimate traffic is classified correctly with a higher threshold, but we also
misclassify anomaly traffic. Even with a small threshold of 0.01, the detection P
is still worst.
Threshold ACC (%) P (%) R (%) F1 (%)
0.01 54.9 21 85 33.67
0.03 55.3 13.9 4.3 6.5
0.05 58.2 1.7 0.26 0.45
Table 6.5: Accuracy Metrics for Different Thresholds
The AE approach with a hard threshold for anomaly detection works quite
well in [102], [103], and [104] but it does not perform well in our experiments.
This phenomenon can be because of the complexity of DDoS attacks in the CI-
CIDS2017 dataset. Some DDoS attacks in this dataset try to mimic behaviours
of legitimate traffic, so they are hard to detect. The construction error rate in
Figure 6.4 can explain our theory quite well with the reconstruction error rate of
both legitimate and anomaly traffic are quite close to each other.
125
6.4 Detection Performance Evaluation
F
ig
u
re
6
.4
:
R
ec
on
st
ru
ct
io
n
E
rr
or
R
at
e
C
om
p
ar
is
io
n
126
6.4 Detection Performance Evaluation
6.4.3 DDoS Attack Detection with the SAE-1SVM
In this section, we analyze the detection performance of the SAE-1SVM. Instead
of using the hard threshold as the previous section, we employ a completely un-
supervised detection approach. The general architecture of the SAE-1SVM has
been described in Figure 6.3. In this experiment, we employ the SAE 2 architec-
ture from the previous experiment for feature representation learning. To begin
with, we present the detection performance of the SAE-1SVM in term of ACC,
P, R and F1 with the Wednesday dataset. We evaluate the proposed model for
binary-classification. We compare the performance of SAE-1SVM with classi-
cal OC-SVM. We also compare the SAE-1SVM with a DL algorithm combined
Convolution Neural Network (CNN) and Long-Short Term Memory (LSTM) pro-
posed by Abdurraman Pektas and Tankut Acarman [108]. They also use the
CICIDS2017 dataset for performance evaluation.
The overall detection performance comparison is depicted in Table 6.6. Ac-
cording to the experimental results shown in Table 6.6, we can see that the SAE-
1SVM outperforms the OC-SVM in all of the evaluation metrics. Specifically,
the SAE-1SVM achieves a much higher P than the OC-SVM. The SAE-1SVM
also achieves better results than the CNN+LSTM algorithm. The main reason
for this high performance is that the OC-SVM in the SAE-1SVM is trained with
the low dimensional representation. The low dimensional representation helps
the OC-SVM characterize the network traffic better, so the detection ACC can
be improved significantly.
For further evaluation, we examine the SAE-1SVM with the Friday dataset.
The details of our evaluation are shown in Table 6.7. The detection ACC for the
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Algorithm ACC (%) P (%) R (%) F1 (%)
OC-SVM 98 96.26 98.21 97.22
CNN+LSTM [108] 98.87 98.89 98.83 98.86
SAE-1SVM 99.35 99.97 98.28 99.11
Table 6.6: The Evaluation Metric Comparison
Friday dataset is 91.43%. This result indicates that the SAE-1SVM can classify
unseen traffic traces as well. The P and R results for this dataset are lower than
those of the Wednesday dataset. Some legitimate samples have been classified as
anomaly samples. This is because the SAE cannot generalize legitimate traffic
traces well enough. The SAE performance can be improved in the future with
further tuning and optimization. However, the overall results still show that the
SAE-1SVM can detect both DoS and DDoS attacks with a high ACC.
Evaluation Metric Result (%)
ACC 91.43
P 88.6
R 71.79
F1 79.31
Table 6.7: The Detection Performane Results with the Friday Dataset
The computational time is an important factor in evaluating the performance
of a classifier. In the era of big data, the classifier has to process a large amount
of data for training and testing. Reducing the computational time is also very
important. The training and testing times of each algorithm are presented in
Table 6.8. As we can see, the SAE-1SVM consumes significantly less time than
OC-SVM in both training and testing processes. The SAE-1SVM is 27 and 6
times faster than the OC-SVM in training and testing respectively. The OC-SVM
module in the SAE-1SVM now only processes 2-dimensional inputs compared to
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13-dimensional inputs in the original OC-SVM, so the processing time has been
reduced significantly. In the SAE-1SVM, the OC-SVM processes more repre-
sentative but lower-dimensional inputs. Therefore, the SAE-1SVM has excellent
potential for real-time NIDS.
Algorithm Traing Time (s) Testing Time (s)
OC-SVM 5110 141
SAE-1SVM 189 26
Table 6.8: The Training and Testing Time Comparison
6.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented a hybrid unsupervised DL approach for DDoS at-
tack detection. The above results show that our proposed approach has strong
potential in detecting DDoS attacks using limited flow features. The experimen-
tal results also show that our SAE-1SVM can deal really well with imbalanced
and unlabeled datasets. Although the final results have a quite high FPR rate,
the SAE-1SVM can be improved in several ways. Several DL approaches can be
applied to the SAE to improve generalizing capability. We can also optimize the
OC-SVM by a grid search algorithm. In future research, we will deploy our pro-
posed approach in a real SDN testbed for more detail analysis. Detecting other
kinds of network attacks will be considered in future research.
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Conclusions and Future Work
The concluding remarks following from the aforementioned work are now
presented. Some limitations of this thesis are also presented. Additionally,
future directions as a result of this work are identified.
In This Chapter:
7.1 Conclusions
As mentioned in the previous chapters, SDN brings us a critical dilemma: an im-
portant potential evolution of networking architectures, along with a very danger-
ous increase in security problems. SDN introduces new faults, and attack planes
that did not exist before or were harder to exploit. These potential security is-
sues are because of network programmability and control logic centralization in
an SDN. However, an SDN can also be utilized to strengthen network security. In
this thesis, we have implemented an end-to-end NIDS - DeepIDS - for the SDN
architecture. The DeepIDS can be deployed in any SDN and which then takes
advantages of global network overview for intrusion detection. As mentioned in
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Chapter 1, several challenges must be solved when developing a NIDS. Therefore,
in this thesis, we researched approaches to address these problems. In chapters 4
and 5, we studied the potential of supervised DL algorithms for intrusion detec-
tion under the SDN context. In Chapter 4, we focused on examining the effect
of different learning rates and features sets on the detection ACC of the DNN
model. We showed that basic flow-based features obtained from SDN controllers
can be used to detect network attacks effectively by the DNN. The DNN also
does not degrade the overall network performance which is a critical evaluation
factor.
Chapter 5 focused on improving the detection ACC of the DeepIDS. We pro-
posed the GRU-RNN that takes advantage of the time-series nature of network
traffic to enhance the detection ACC. We demonstrated that the GRU-RNN does
improve the detection ACC significantly compared to the DNN. Although the
experimental results showed that the GRU-RNN is more complex and demands
more computational resources than the DNN, the trade-off between the detection
ACC and the network performance is still acceptable.
In chapter 6, we explored the field of unsupervised learning. The SAE-1SVM
was introduced to deal with the unlabeled and imbalanced dataset in Chapter 1.
The SAE-1SVM is designed to learn the characteristic of legitimate network traffic
and then detect anomalies that have a different nature. Another advantage of the
SAE-1SVM is that it overcomes the high complexity problem of the OC-SVM.
The following is a brief summary of the key contributions of this thesis. These
also answer the research questions raised in Chapter 1.
• An end-to-end NIDS has been proposed for the SDN paradigm. This sys-
tem can monitor the whole network and collect all the necessary network
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information. This information can be then used to detect any abnormal
activity and then mitigate it as soon as possible.
• Several DL algorithms from simple to complex have been developed for a
flow-based anomaly detection approach. We have demonstrated that DL
algorithms can achieve high detection ACC without degrading the perfor-
mance of the SDN controller.
• The unlabeled and imbalanced dataset problem has been addressed and
partly solved in this thesis.
7.2 Limitations
There are a few limitations associated with our work in this thesis.
• As mentioned in Chapter 1, the lack of an SDN-based dataset is a huge
problem. Therefore, in this thesis, we have to adapt some conventional
datasets to the SDN architecture. This adaption may not be close enough to
a real SDN-based dataset but many researchers in the same field still use it.
In Chapter 4 and 5, the packet-based NSL-KDD dataset is adapted for our
experiments. This adaption may affect the generalization and application
of our approach in the SDN context. However, we selected some most basic
network features having similar characteristics in both packet-based and
flow-based datasets to minimize this gap. We also try to use a flow-based
dataset (The CICIDS2017 dataset) to fill the gap in our research.
• Because of the use of published datasets, all the attacks concerned in this
thesis are just related to network and application layers (i.e., L2, L3 and
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L7). This thesis does not consider any kind of attacks related to L1 physical
layer which is also an important part of the network.
• Although our proposed approaches have been evaluated in term of through-
put and latency, they have not been deployed in any real SDN testbed yet.
Because of limited facilities and resources, a more detail network perfor-
mance evaluation has not been done yet.
• Hyper-parameters of our DL models such as learning rate, batch size, num-
ber of neurons and number of layers was chosen as some state-of-the-art
literature. We trained the DL models with different combinations of hyper-
parameters to find the best results. However, the training process still can
be further optimized to achieve a better result.
7.3 Future Work
In order to solve the above limitations, several improvements can be implemented
as a part of our future work.
Analysis with Real SDN Testbed and Network Traffic
Currently, all the work has been done in an oﬄine manner. All the DL
algorithms are trained with several datasets to detect intrusion, but some of these
datasets are outdated. In addition, some legitimate and anomaly traffic in these
datasets are synthetic, so they cannot reflect real network scenarios. It would be
better to implement our approach in an SDN testbed with real legitimate and
anomaly traffic for further evaluation. It would be interesting to see how our
method works with real networks and how quickly it can respond to the network
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attacks. Furthermore, taking into account the nature of streaming data, online
ML/DL algorithms should be considered in future work. In addition, our current
work is focused on developing the Anomaly Detection module of the DeepIDS.
The Collector and Counter Measure module development should be done in future
research.
Analysis of Hyper-parameters and Network Features
As can be seen in Chapters 3 and 4, we achieved the results for a potential
NIDS. However, it would be beneficial for us to do an exhaustive grid search to
optimize our DL models with different hyper-parameters. For DL algorithms,
every problem and every dataset require different hyper-parameters, and so the
analysis of hyper-parameters is necessary. But when we deploy the NIDS in a
real network, several network features can be collected for intrusion detection.
Chapter 4 shows that different feature sets have different effects on the detection
ACC, and so we also need to do more research on network feature selection.
Analysis of DL Algorithms
In this thesis, we have implemented several types of DL algorithms which are
both supervised and unsupervised approaches. However, these DL algorithms
(i.e., DNN, RNN, SAE) are just a small part of DL techniques. Various combina-
tions of DL algorithms can be implemented for the anomaly detection problem.
Recently, CNN has yielded significant achievements in the field of image pro-
cessing because of its ability to learn spatial correlations. CNN now has been
gradually adapted to detect network anomalies. For example, RNN and CNN are
combined in [108] to learn both temporal and spatial relations of network data
that can improve the intrusion detection ACC. CNN can be combined with other
DL algorithms for further research. However, network data is not an image, so we
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have to convert network data to an image’s structure. This is not a clear process,
so it would be interesting to see the application of CNN for intrusion detection
in the future.
Exploiting Applications of SDN and DL in Internet of Things Frame-
work
Finally, the Internet of Things (IoT) is an emerging technology and expected
to have around 50 billion devices connected to the Internet by 2020. As the
number of IoT devices is increasing dramatically, they are becoming the primary
targets for hackers. Now IoT devices can be used to attack other networks on
a large scale and then damage them severely. IoT devices generate a massive
amount of network traffic with many types of data that could threaten the security
of the whole network. Last year, Mirai’s IoT DDoS attacks had taken down
several vital services all over the world. These types of attacks are becoming
more and more popular and are very difficult to detect and mitigate in a real-
time manner. A combination of SDN and an IoT framework as in [109], [110]
and [111] can strengthen the network security, so it is also a potential future
research trend. SDN architectures can be used to monitor and collect network
information from IoT networks. DL has the ability to learn valuable information
from complex data, so it has also potential for intrusion detection in IoT networks.
7.4 Final Remarks
In summary, this thesis has introduced the application of DL in detecting intru-
sions under the context of an SDN architecture. According to the experimental
results, we show the strong potential of DL. DL can learn the network’s patterns
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with some limited raw netwok input features. With the use of NSL-KDD and CI-
CIDS2017 datasets, we demonstrate the potential of DL in detecting anomalies
in both small scale networks (i.e., Small Home/Office or Enterprise) and large
networks. Although the achieved results are still far from real-life applications,
this is just some first steps in solving a big problem, and several improvements
can be made in the future.
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Appendix
A.1 Preparing Data
• Data Preprocessing: formatting and cleaning data, removing all missing
values, encoding all categorical values to numbers or one-hot vector.
• Data Transformation: transforming all preprocessed data for ML/DL by
scaling, aggregating.
A.2 Performance Evaluation Processes
After preparing data and training an ML/DL, we need to evaluate the perfor-
mance of the ML/DL model. The evaluation process can be done as the following:
• Training and Testing Datasets: during the training processing, the
ML/DL will not be exposed to the testing dataset. Any prediction result
in the testing dataset indicates the model performance in general. We are
expecting a model with high ACC on the testing set.
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• Performance Measure: the model performance then is further assessed
by evaluation metrics (Section 2.4). These metrics are standard for classi-
fication problems, so they can be used for anomaly classification.
• Literature Comparision: the model performance then will be compared
with some state-of-the-art literature for a final decision. In general, these
literature use the same dataset as us for training and testing ML/DL mod-
els. All the classification problem also uses the same evaluation metrics, so
it is really convenient for comparison.
A.3 Experiment Testbed Setup
The experiment testbed for SDN networks is implemented in an Intel PC using
Mininet. Because of the lack of resources and the ease of experiment, a network
with several switches and hosts in a star topology is emulated for simulation
purpose. The testbed has three main components as seen in Figure A.1.
• SDN Controller: the POX [35] controller is used for SDN networks con-
trolling purpose.
• NIDS Module: the DeepIDS module is written in Python and runs on
top of the POX controller. This module is in charge of monitoring network
traffic, detecting and mitigating anomalies.
• Switches: OpenFlow switches are emulated by Mininet and connected to
the POX controller via OpenFlow protocol.
• Hosts: Several hosts are emulated by Mininet and connected to the switch
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in a star topology. These hosts act as attackers and victims in the simula-
tion.
Figure A.1: The Emulated Network Topology
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